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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code' (Code) permits the
exclusion from gross income of "the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or periodic
payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." Although this
provision has been part of the federal income tax laws in substantially
its present form since 1918,2 its applicability to many types of recoveries
remains unsettled. The greatest uncertainty exists with respect to re-
coveries that are not typically viewed as involving a traditional type
of personal injury, such as recoveries under federal antidiscrimination
statutes and recoveries for "wrongful discharge." Such recoveries,
unknown and unanticipated when the predecessor of section 104(a)(2)
was enacted, are today neither rare nor inconsequential.3
Not surprisingly, as the national debates about tort reform and
tax reform have intensified and as the number and size of traditional
and nontraditional recoveries have mushroomed, the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) has taken an increasingly narrower view of the stat-
utory exclusion. In recent years the Service has reversed its previous
position and ruled that punitive damages are not excludable under
section 104(a)(2)4 and has persisted in maintaining that most business-
related nonphysical injuries do not qualify for the exclusion.' Until
very recently, the courts encouraged such positions by consistently
ignoring the statutory language and focusing instead on whether the
monetary award represented a recovery of an essentially unmeasurable
form of "human capital, ' 6 or instead on whether the recovery was
intended to substitute for an otherwise taxable item, such as lost income
1. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, 26
U.S.C.A. § 1-7872 (1986).
2. As originally enacted in 1918, the exclusion applied to:
Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen's
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the
amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account
of such injuries or sickness.
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 (1919).
3. See, e.g., Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1987) (re-
viewing jury award of $300,000 compensatory damages and $3 million punitive damages
in case against employer involving Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981).
4. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
5. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
6. For a thorough analysis of the "human capital" issue, see Stephan, Taxation
and Human Capital, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1357 (1984).
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or compensation. The law has been so unsettled, in fact, that identically
situated tort victims could be subject to differing federal income tax
treatment depending on such fortuities as the victim's occupation,
whether the injury was physical or nonphysical, the proof offered to
substantiate the claimed damages, and the applicable state law's char-
acterization of the damages as compensatory or punitive. Moreover,
the size of the victim's award will be directly affected by whether
applicable federal or state law prohibits or requires jury consideration
of the tax-exempt status of the award.
The most fundamental area of uncertainty is the proper analysis
by which to determine whether an injury is "personal." At least since
1922, it has been clear that "personal" injuries included both physical
and nonphysical injuries.7 Thus, recoveries for such "dignitary" injuries
as defamation of character and alienation of affections have been tax-
exempt in theory at least for more than sixty-five years. In practice,
the excludability of recoveries for nonphysical injuries has been denied
consistently if the recovery (whether by judgment or settlement) is
based on lost earnings or otherwise taxable income. Rather than fo-
cusing on whether the nature of the claim is in tort or contract, courts
have based the tax consequences of the recovery on whether the re-
covery appears to be a substitute for lost earnings. If a recovery for
a nonphysical injury appears related to lost wages or other compen-
sation, then the courts have consistently-and wrongly-required that
the award be included in income, notwithstanding that recoveries of
lost income for personal injuries are (and have been since 1918) ex-
cludable under section 104(a)(2). s
This method of separating nonphysical "personal" injury recoveries
(fully excludable from income) from nonpersonal "business" recoveries
(fully taxable), based on whether the recovery is tied to the recipient's
lost earnings, has been endorsed uncritically by the courts for years.
Two related theories or approaches have evolved. First, the court
inquires "in lieu of what" were the damages awarded. If the answer
to this inappropriate question is "compensation" or "earnings," then
the award is taxable. Second, the court may inquire whether the injury
damaged the victim's personal reputation or his business or professional
reputation. If the inquiry answered in the affirmative is the latter,
then the award is held taxable as not being made "on account of
personal injury."
7. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922), superseded by Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B.
33.
8. The Service recently reaffirmed the excludability of damages representing lost
wages in the context of a physical injury (the taxpayer had been hit by a bus). Rev.
Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50.
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Three recent decisions of the United States Tax Court properly
reject these lines of analysis and focus instead on the nature of the
alleged injury. The government filed appeals in these three decisions,
however, and the most recent Tax Court decision on this question may
signal a retreat by the Tax Court. In Threlkeld v. Commissioner,9 a
reviewed decision,10 the Tax Court explicitly rejected the business-
reputation versus personal-reputation analysis and held that "[there
is no justification for continuing to draw a distinction, in tort actions,
between damages received for injury to personal reputation and dam-
ages received for injury to professional reputation."" Thus, injury to
one's reputation is always "personal," and damages recovered are fully
excludable. Similarly, the Tax Court held in Bent v. Commissioner12
that a recovery by a teacher under 42 United States Code section 1983
of an amount designed to compensate him for lost earnings is ex-
cludable under section 104(a)(2) because the injury was a personal
injury. Significantly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision on December 15, 1987 and squarely aligned itself with the
Ninth Circuit, the only other circuit that has addressed the issue. 3
More recently, the Tax Court in Metzger v. Commissioner 4 upheld
the exclusion of a portion of a settlement of various claims, including
Title VII claims, brought by a college professor who alleged that she
was denied tenure because of impermissible gender and national origin
discrimination. The Metzger court distinguished a previous decision in
which the Tax Court held back pay recoveries under Title VII were
not eligible for exclusion under section 104(a)(2) and found that the
recovery was for "personal injuries." Metzger is on appeal to the
Third Circuit, which has affirmed the Bent decision.
In a decision filed September 21, 1987, the Tax Court appears to
have retreated somewhat from its newly expansive view of section
9. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), appeal docketed, No. 87-1511 (6th Cir., May 26, 1987).
10. "Reviewed decisions" are officially-reported "regular" decisions of the United
States Tax Court that have been reviewed by all nineteen judges. "Regular" decisions
are those that involve an interpretation of law. "Memorandum decisions," which are
not officially reported, resolve only questions of fact and apply settled legal principles.
The Chief Judge reviews all "regular decisions," and selects only certain decisions for
review by the full membership of the court. See generally Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
1 5801.315 (1987).
11. 87 T.C. at 1298.
12. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
13. For a discussion of the decision of the Ninth Circuit decision, Roemer v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), see infra text accompanying notes 108-
24.
14. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-1428 (3d Cir. July 16, 1987).
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104(a)(2). In Thompson v. Commissioner,5 the court held that back
pay awarded under the Equal Pay Act' 6 was not excludable under
section 104(a)(2). Citing and applying the "in lieu of what" test, the
court found that back pay recoveries under the Equal Pay Act are
essentially recoveries for contractual violations rather than for personal
injuries. Part II of this article traces the development of the law
governing taxation of personal injury recoveries and concludes that
the Threlkeld, Bent, and Metzger decisions correctly reject the "in lieu
of what" test, thereby at long last returning to the analysis demanded
by the statute. Although Bent has been affirmed on appeal by the
same circuit that will hear Metzger, the Thompson case may signal a
retreat by the Tax Court.
A second area of uncertainty is the meaning of the term "dam-
ages." The statutory exclusion applies to "any damages received . . .
on account of personal injuries." In a 1984 ruling,' 7 the Service con-
cluded that punitive damages do not qualify for the exclusion because
they are intended to punish the tortfeasor rather than to restore a loss
of capital. The only court that has considered this ruling rejected it
as an unauthorized administrative attempt to amend section 104(a)(2).18
Part III of this article analyzes the excludability of punitive damages
under section 104(a)(2).
Other areas of uncertainty abound, although they are beyond the
scope of this article. Perhaps the most troubling of these is the dizzying
array of federal and state rules concerning whether the defendant may
introduce evidence of the income tax effects on the calculation of the
victim's lost earnings and whether the jury may or must be instructed
that its award will be tax-free. Traditionally, juries have not been
instructed on the tax-exempt nature of personal injury awards, and
most courts have not permitted defendants to decrease the "lost earn-
ings" components of damage awards via evidence of net after-tax
earnings versus gross before-tax earnings.' 9 In a 1980 decision arising
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the Supreme Court
held that in a wrongful death action arising under the FELA, federal
income tax is a relevant factor in determining a defendant's lost earn-
ings and, upon request, the jury must be instructed on the tax-exempt
15. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), appeal docketed, Nos. 88-3801 and 88-3924 (4th Cir. Jan.
6, 1988 and Jan. 28, 1988) (consolidated).
16. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d) (1978).
17. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
18. Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986). Although the
Justice Department filed an appeal, it dismissed the appeal on December 18, 1986.
19. See generally, Frolick, Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured
Tort Settlements: Tax Policy "Derailed", 51 Fordham L. Rev. 565, 583-89 (1983).
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nature of the award. 20 The Court later characterized this holding as
a "federal common law rule ' 2' and extended it to actions arising under
other federal laws. 22
Other courts have applied this federal common law rule to a wide
variety of actions under various federal laws.23 Some federal courts
have even applied the rule in diversity cases where the state law was
exactly contrary to the federal rule. 24 Thus, the size of the victim's
award will vary depending on whether his action arises under federal
or state law and, if arising under the latter, whether the action is
brought in state or federal court. I
Others have questioned whether the generous statutory exemption is
justifiable on policy grounds," and some have concluded that the exclusion
of damages for lost earnings should be repealed26 and that punitive damages
20. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S. Ct. 755, reh'g denied,
445 U.S. 972, 100 S. Ct. 1667 (1980).
21. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486, 101 S. Ct. 2870,
2880 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. 473, 101 S. Ct. 2870 (Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 534, 103 S.
Ct. 2541, 2549 (1983) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
23. E.g., the Jones Act, Portier v. Texaco, Inc., 426 So. 2d 623, 630 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 433 So. 2d 165 (1983); Death on High Seas Act, Stoddard
v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 339, 342 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Federal Tort
Claims Act, Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1984); Flannery
v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111-12 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226,
104 S. Ct. 2679 (1984); Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (5th Cir.
1982). Not all courts agree that the Liepelt rule applies in Federal Tort Claims Act
cases, however. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 685 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1982).
24. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 803 F.2d 304, 314-16 (7th Cir. 1986)
(declining to follow Arizona law); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 701 F.2d
1189, 1192-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866, 104 S. Ct. 204 (1983) (declining
to follow Illinois law). Contra Coy v. Simpson Marine Safety Equip., Inc. 787 F.2d
19, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1986); Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1045
(5th Cir. 1984).
25. See, e.g., Frolick, supra note 19; Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
614, 624-27 (1952); Henry, "Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: Taxation of Personal
Injury Recoveries," 23 Hous. L. Rev. 701, 723-29 (1986); Knickerbocker, The Income
Tax Treatment of Damages: A Study in the Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47
Cornell L.Q. 429, 436-40 (1962); Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax
Policy Considerations, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 701 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Burke and Friel, Recent Developments in the Income Taxation of
Individuals, 9 Rev. Tax'n Individuals 292, 300 (1985) ("Section 104(a)(2) ... should
-be limited to exclude only damages for disability, disfigurement, pain and suffering,
and medical expenses. Damages for lost wages and profits should be excepted from
Section 104(a)(2) and should be taxed in accord with the general rules of Section 61.");
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should be taxed.27 Because the courts generally have refused to allow an
exclusion for compensation-based damages for nonphysical personal in-
juries, the economic impact of the exclusion has been diminished and the policy
debate, accordingly, has been intermittent and muted. For example,
Congress left section 104(a)(2) untouched by the Tax Reform Act of
1986.28 As part of the Tax Reform Act, however, Congress amended
section 130,29 which provides favorable tax treatment for assignments
of structured settlement obligations. Prior to the 1986 amendment,
section 130 applied to assignments in cases involving "personal injury
or sickness." For settlements entered into after December 31, 1986,
however, favorable treatment under section 130 will apply only to
assignments in cases "involving physical injury or physical sickness." 30
Thus, Congress has removed the category of nonphysical personal
injury awards from the favorable treatment afforded by section 130
for assignments of structured settlement obligations.
A similar amendment to section 104(a)(2) in the near future is a
distinct possibility. The taxpayer victories in Threlkeld, Bent, and Metz-
ger, coupled with the uncertain tax consequences of punitive damages
recoveries in all personal injury actions, and the imminent acknow-
ledgment of the potential applicability of section 104(a)(2) in other
categories of cases, such as "tortious breach of contract"'" cases,
should spark further reexamination of the confusing and inconsistent
income tax aspects of our system of compensating tort victims.
Much of the confusion that reigns currently is directly traceable
to application of the "in lieu of what" test, a test which ignores
the necessity of interpreting the statutory terms "personal" injury and
"any damages." This article will analyze the Service's approach to
both terms and will suggest that the courts are correctly beginning
to reject that position. Whether injuries are "personal" should be de-
termined by reference to all the facts and circumstances, particularly
the applicable state or federal law that is the basis of the plaintiff's
cause of action. Inherently personal "dignitary" invasions are "per-
sonal" injuries, notwithstanding that the principal measurable impact
is on the plaintiff's career or earnings. In addition, the exclusion of
Forlick, supra note 19, at 567 ("[Tlhis Article recommends that Congress amend the
section to remove the exemption for any amounts paid as compensation for lost earnings.").
27. See, e.g., Burke and Friel, supra note 26 at, 305 n.62 ("[P]unitive damages
* should appropriately be viewed as something other than damages for personal
injuries.").
28. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
29. I.R.C. § 130 (1986). For an explanation of section 130 and the recent amendment
to it, see Winslow, Tax Reform Preserves Structured Settlements, 65 Taxes 22 (1987).
30. I.R.C. § 130 (1986) (emphasis added).
31. See infra section E of Part II.
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"any damages" encompasses punitive damages. Whether the exclusion
should be limited to compensatory damages for physical injuries is a
decision to be made by Congress, not the Service.
II. "PERSONAL" INJURY: CONFUSING THE INJURY WITH
IT5 CONSEQUENCES
Several fundamental principles govern the taxability of litigation
settlements and judgments. First, any "accession to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion" is
"income" within the meaning of section 61(a) of the Code.32 Unless
there is a specific statutory exclusion available, and unless the award
represents a mere recovery of capital,33 the recovery must be included
in the recipient's gross income. For personal injury recoveries, section
104(a)(2) is the specific statutory authorization for exclusion from
income.3 4 The tax consequences of an award thus depend on the origin
and character of the claims. 5 If the claims are "based upon tort or
tort type rights," '3 6 then the recovery is excludable under section 104(a)(2);
but if the claims are for breach of contract or injury to one's business
or property, the recovery is not "on account of personal injuries" and
thus not excludable under section 104(a)(2).
Taxable recoveries are generally taxed in the same manner as the
items for which the recovery is intended to substitute.3 7 The proper
inquiry to determine the tax effects of damage recoveries not governed
by section 104(a)(2) is "in lieu of what" were the damages awarded.3
Resolution of that question determines both the amount and character
of the plaintiff's income.39 On the other hand, the tax consequences
of personal injury recoveries should be determined by the threshold
inquiry into whether the injury is personal. If the injury is personal,
then "any damages" recovered "on account of" such injuries are
automatically excludable under the statute, regardless of the nature of
the items for which the damages are intended to substitute.
Although wages are generally fully taxable, a personal injury re-
covery measured solely or principally by the plaintiff's lost wages should
32. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431, 75 S. Ct. 473, 477,
reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925, 75 S. Ct. 657 (1955).
33. See, e.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (lst Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779, 65 S. Ct. 192 (1944); Rev. Rul 81-277, 1981-2 C.B. 14.
34. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1986).
35. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 83 S. Ct. 623 (1963).
36. Treas. Regs. § 1.104-1(c) (1987).
37. See, e.g., Raytheon, 144 F.2d at 113.
38. Id.
39. E.g., id.; Rev. Rul. 81-277, 1981-2 C.B. 14.
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be excluded from income under the broad exemption of section
104(a)(2). 40 Incantation of the "in lieu of what" test in personal injury
cases is therefore both unnecessary and misleading. As the following
analysis illustrates, erroneous application of the "in lieu of what" test
in cases involving recoveries for nonphysical injuries has created sig-
nificant and unwarranted barriers for victims of employment-related
torts.
A. Asking the Wrong Question: Are Personal Injury Damages
"Income"?
1. The Early Decisions
As has been chronicled by others, '4 1 Congress was prompted in
1918 to enact the statutory exclusion from income of personal injury
damages at least in part because of doubts whether such recoveries
constituted income.4 2 Enactment of the statutory exclusion, however,
did not dissuade the Service and the courts from analyzing whether a
recovery was income in the first instance. Following the Supreme
Court's 1920 decision in Eisner v. Macomber,43 in which the Court
endorsed its earlier definition of income as "the gain derived from
capital, or from labor, or from both combined, '"44 the Service issued
a ruling45 (the "1922 Solicitor's Opinion") in which it held that re-
coveries for certain nonphysical personal injuries do not constitute
income. The Service reasoned that:
there is no gain, and therefore no income, derived from the
receipt of damages for alienation of affections or defamation
of personal character. . . . If an individual is possessed of a
personal right that is not assignable and not susceptible of any
appraisal in relation to market values, and therefor receives
either damages or payment in compromise for an invasion of
that right, it can not be held that he thereby derives any gain
40. The Service recently reaffirmed this principle in the context of a physical injury.
Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50.
41. See, e.g., Knickerbocker, supra note 25.
42. An unpublished ruling, T.D. 2747, and an Attorney General's Opinion issued
in 1918, concluded, respectively, that amounts received as a result of a suit, or in
settlement of, a personal injury claim, and proceeds of an accident insurance policy,
were not subject to tax. Sol. Mem. 1384, 1920-2 C.B. 71, revoked by Sol. Op. 132,
1-1 C.B. 92 (1922); see Knickerbocker, supra note 25, at 430.
43. 252 U.S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
44. Id. at 207, 40 S. Ct. at 193.
45. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922), superseded by Rev. Rul 74-77, 1974-1 C.B.
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or profit."6
Although this ruling's heading refers to section 213(b)(6) of the
1918 Act (the predecessor of section 104(a)(2)), the statutory exclusion
is not relied upon in the ruling. Instead, the Solicitor addressed earlier
rulings that had held damages for alienation of affections47 and recoveries
for libel 8 not excludable under former section 213(b)(6). The 1922
Solicitor's Opinion stated that "the question is really more fundamental,
namely whether such damages are within the legal definition of in-
come."'" Relying on the definition of income in Eisner v. Macomber,
the Solicitor found that recoveries for certain types of nonphysical
personal injuries are not income in the first instance because such
recoveries bear no element of gain. Significantly, the 1922 Solicitor's
Opinion noted a distinction between defamation recoveries for injury
to personal reputation as opposed to business reputation, but did not
rule on the taxability of the latter type of recovery."
The first reported case on the question, Hawkins v. Commissioner,51
appeared in 1922. In Hawkins the taxpayer instructed his attorney to
sue a corporation and its officers after he was removed from his
position as president of the corporation. The threatened suit would
have alleged libel and slander, with injury to his reputation, business
and health. Rejecting the Service's argument that the settlement was
taxable, the court held that the entire settlement received by the tax-
payer was excludable because it represented "compensation for injury
to his personal reputation for integrity and fair dealing, including ...
the injury to his health." 2 Because the tax year at issue in Hawkins
was 1919, it is noteworthy that the court did not rely on or even
mention the predecessor of section 104(a)(2), which had been enacted
in 1918. Instead, consistent with the analysis of the Service at the
time, the court found that the recovery did not constitute income.
Following Hawkins, a series of decisions permitted exclusion of
business-related recoveries on the theory that the recoveries were not
income because they were either a return of capital or a windfall. 3
For example, damages for injury to business goodwill were recognized
46. Id. at 93-94.
47. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, revoked by Sol. Op. 132, I-1, C.B. 92 (1922).
48. 1 C.B. 65, modified by Sol. Op. 132, I-1, C.B. 92 (1922).
49. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922), superseded by Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1
C.B. 33.
50. Id.
51. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq., 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
52. Id. at 1024.
53. See generally, Knickerbocker, supra note 25, at 433-35 (citing cases).
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in 1932 as nontaxable because they represented a mere return of capital.14
Such is still the case: if an injury results in damage to an asset in
which the taxpayer has a basis,55 the recovery is excludable from income
to the extent it represents a mere return of the taxpayer's investment.5 6
Although the return-of-capital analysis is a fundamental principle un-
derlying the taxation of non-personal injury recoveries, it is irrelevant
to the issue of excludability under section 104(a)(2). Any recovery of
"damages" (including settlements) "on account of personal injuries"
is excludable from gross income. Accordingly, the first and only inquiry
is whether the recovery is for personal injury; if it is, then "any
damages" received are excludable, regardless of whether they would
otherwise constitute income in the first instance.
2. The "In Lieu of What" Test
In its 1944 decision in Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commis-
sioner,5 7 the First Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the test for the
taxability of business injury recoveries. The Raytheon court, which
was considering the taxability of an antitrust recovery, described the
proper analysis as follows: "The test is not whether the action was
one in tort or contract but rather the question to be asked is 'In lieu
of what were the damages awarded?' 5'. Of course, the opposite analysis
should govern any question of excludability under section 104(a)(2).
In such cases, the Raytheon standard should be rephrased as follows:
The test is whether the action is one in tort or contract. If it is an
action in tort, it is irrelevant in lieu of what the damages were awarded.
Despite the inapplicability of the Raytheon analysis to personal
injury recoveries, for more than forty years the courts have ritualis-
tically recited the "in lieu of what" test as the governing principle.5 9
54. Farmers & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932).
55. "Basis," for federal income tax purposes, is generally the taxpayer's cost or
investment in the asset. I.R.C. § 1012 (1986).
56. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-277, 1981-2 C.B. 14, 15 ("If ... the recovery is treated
as a replacement of capital, the damages received from the lawsuit are treated as a
return of capital and are not taxable as income.").
57. 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944).
58. Id. at 113.
59. For recent examples, each citing Raytheon and other cases, see Thompson v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632 (1987), appeal docketed, Nos. 88-3801 and 88-3924 (4th
Cir. Jan. 6, 1988 and Jan. 28, 1988) (consolidated) (Title VII and Equal Pay Act
recovery) ("The question to be asked is 'in lieu of what were the damages awarded."')
(citing Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982), aff'd, 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984));
Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1107 (1983) (defamation action) ("The proper
inquiry is in lieu of what are the damages awarded."); Madson v. Commissioner, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 425, 427 (1985) (denial of equal protection and breach of contract in
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Because the courts were asking the wrong question, the results were
predictably favorable to the Service in cases in which taxpayers at-
tempted to exclude recoveries for employment-related injuries. If the
recovery appeared to be "in lieu of" wages, earnings, severance pay
or some other element of the recipient's compensation, then the re-
covery was held taxable.
The flaw in this analysis is patent: if the injury that is being
compensated is a "personal" injury, then all damages received "on
account of" it are excludable under section 104(a)(2), including damages
for lost earnings. If the recovery represents damages for breach of
contract or any other non-tort or tort-type injury, then the damages
are fully taxable, unless they merely restore a taxpayer's basis. Thus,
the threshold inquiry should always be into the nature of the claim
or injury, and the presence or absence of a discernible link between
the recovery and the recipient's compensation arrangement should be
irrelevant. Especially in employment-related cases, application of the
"in lieu of what" test has skewed the analysis and led to unfair results.
A footnote in a famous Supreme Court decision has compounded
the confusion. In 1955 the Supreme Court refined its earlier definition
of "income" to include windfall recoveries. In Glenshaw Glass Co.
v. Commissioner, 60 the Court held that punitive damages recovered in
business fraud and antitrust cases were income. Denying that its earlier
definition of income in Eisner v. Macomber6' was "meant to provide
a touchstone to all future gross income questions," the Court estab-
lished a definition of income broad enough to encompass such items
as windfalls and discovery of treasure trove. 62 In a footnote the Court
in Glenshaw Glass also distinguished the recoveries at issue from per-
sonal injury recoveries. Apparently approving the early rulings that
held personal injury recoveries to be a nontaxable return of capital,
the Court observed that these rulings "cannot support exemption of
punitive damages following injury to property. ' 63 As discussed in Part
III, infra, this footnote has become the cornerstone of the Service's
current position that punitive damages in personal injury cases are
taxable because they are not a restoration of capital. By appearing to
terminating unemployment) ("The relevant inquiry is, 'In lieu of what were the damages
awarded?'); Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982), aff'd, 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.
1984) (settlement involving alleged mental distress recovery) ("The question to be asked
is: 'In lieu of what were the damages awarded?')
60. 348 U.S. 426, 75 S. Ct. 473, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925, 75 S. Ct. 657 (1955).
61. 252 U.S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
62. Shortly after the Glenshaw Glass decision, the Treasury Department promulgated
regulations under section 61 enumerating miscellaneous categories of receipts that con-
stitute income. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (1987).
63. 348 U.S. at 431 n.8, 75 S. Ct. at 477 n.8.
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endorse the return of capital analysis for compensatory personal injury
recoveries, this footnote also encouraged the return of capital analysis
in section 104(a)(2) cases.
On the other hand, taxpayers may not rely on the return of capital
analysis to justify exclusion of payments in exchange for bodily parts
or products. Nor may advance payments for future invasions of privacy
be excluded under section 104(a)(2). 64 The Service summarily rejected
the return of capital analysis in United States v. Garber,65 a case
involving the sale of rare blood plasma. The taxpayer in Garber was
prosecuted for willful evasion of income taxes because she excluded
from income the substantial payments she received for her plasma.
The trial judge refused to admit into evidence the testimony of an
expert defense witness that the taxpayer's receipts did not constitute
income, but instead were a nontaxable recovery of her basis in her
blood. The government's expert witness, however, was permitted to
testify that the taxpayer's receipts constituted taxable income, on the
theory that the plasma donations were personal services, not the sale
of a product. 66 Another expert witness for the government, whose
testimony was excluded, opined that if the transaction was a sale of
a product rather than a service, it would still be taxable because "there
would be no tax basis or original cost for the product sold, and the
entire sales price would constitute gain subject to tax under section
61(a)(3). ' '167
This curious case suggests that the Service's view of the taxpayer's
basis in his body depends on the context in which the issue arises. If
one sells part of one's body (e.g., blood or an organ), then the Service
apparently will assign a basis of zero to the bodily part, with the result
being that the entire payment received is taxable. On the other hand,
individuals who recover damages for physical personal injuries will
receive the benefit of a deemed basis in their injured bodily part equal
to the damages received, and thus will escape taxation because the
recovery is a mere return of capital. 68
Thus, application of two related but superfluous tests has thor-
oughly skewed the analysis and results in employment-related non-
physical personal injury cases. The return of capital analysis, unnec-
64. See, e.g., Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'g, 35 T.C.
646 (1961). See infra Part III for a discussion of Starrels.
65. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979) (rehearing en banc rev'g 589 F.2d 843).
66. Id. at 95-96.
67. Id. at 95.
68. See generally, Stephan, Taxation and Human Capital, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1357
(1984).
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essarily applied by the Service and the courts despite the specific
statutory exclusion, led the courts to conclude that certain recoveries
did not constitute income in the first instance. That same analysis,
however, led to the uncritical importation of the "in lieu of what"
test into section 104(a)(2) jurisprudence, with the predictable (but in-
correct) result that damages tied to or measured by an otherwise taxable
item, such as salary or earnings, almost always have been held not
excludable.
The continuing allure of the "in lieu of what" analysis is evident
in a recent Supreme Court decision 69 concerning the Federal Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.70 The issue was
whether a state could consider personal injury recoveries as income in
determining need for purposes of the AFDC program. In a five to
four decision, both the majority and dissent agreed, in dicta, on the
principle that personal injury damages for lost earnings, under the
Code, were income. The majority stated:
[T]he premise that personal injury awards cannot involve gain
is obviously false, since they often are intended in significant
part to compensate for the loss of gain, e.g., lost wages. Since
the gain would have been income, surely at least that part of
a personal injury award that replaces it must also be income. 7'
The dissenters conceded this point. After noting that it would be
unlikely that "an impoverished family" would receive a large personal
injury award for lost income, the dissenters reasoned as follows:
If it does, however, it is reasonable to treat such an award as
income. I cannot agree, however, that it is reasonable to treat
the entire personal injury award as income. Damages for pain
and suffering, disfigurement, loss of consortium, and the like
are intended to compensate the recipient for nonpecuniary
losses.72
Although section 104(a)(2) was not an issue directly before the Court,
and therefore the issue of excludability of amounts that would otherwise
be taxable income was not before the Court, this dicta is a sobering
reminder of the long-standing antipathy to taxpayers' attempts to ex-
clude recoveries representing lost earnings from income.
B. Allocated versus Lump-Sum Recoveries
Because neither section 104(a)(2) of the Code nor the regulations
under it describe how one establishes that damages were received "on
69. Lukhard v. Reed, 107 S. Ct. 1807 (1987).
70. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-615 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
71. 107 S. Ct. at 1811.
72. Id. at 1819 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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account of personal injuries," and because section 104(a)(2) is an
exception to the general rule of taxability of damages, the courts have
required the taxpayer to establish that any recovery excluded from
income is, in fact, on account of personal injuries. Methods of proof
differ, of course, depending on whether the recovery is in settlement
of an actual or threatened action or is court-ordered.
1. Jury Awards
Unallocated jury awards in cases where past and future medical
expenses formed part of plaintiff's evidence of damages present two
problems. First, any portion of the award allocated to past medical
expenses must be included in income under the express terms of section
104(a)(2). As to future medical expenses, section 213 prohibits future
medical expense deductions to the extent that the taxpayer has already
been compensated for the expense "by insurance or otherwise." Thus,
amounts actually allocated by the jury to future medical expenses will
not support a deduction until the future expenses exceed the damages
allocated to future medical expenses. 71
If the plaintiff's award is not allocated between specified past and
future medical expenses, the Service will require the plaintiff to allocate
a portion of the award to future medical expenses and forego future
medical expense deductions until the future expenses exceed the amount
as allocated. 714 In the only reported decision considering allocation of
a lump-sum jury award to future medical expenses, the Ninth Circuit
refused to uphold an allocation by the Service of part of the award
to nondeductible future medical expenses. In Niles v. United States,"
the court held that the Service had the burden of establishing the
amount that the jury intended as compensation for future medical
expenses, and that such burden could not be discharged because only
the jury could know what it intended. Thus, the plaintiff may benefit
twice from an unallocated and unallocable award that is intended to
compensate for future medical expense: the recovery is excludable from
income in the first instance, and the later expenditures for medical
expenses are deductible. 76
2. Out-of-court Settlements
As to out-of-court settlements, both the statute itself and the
regulations specify that the exclusion of "any damages" includes amounts
73. I.R.C. § 213 (1986); see Rev. Rul. 75-323, 1975-2 C.B. 346.
74. Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 120.
75. 710 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1983).
76. For criticism of this decision, see Note, Niles v. United States: Double Tax
Benefits Arise From the Ninth Circuit's Questionable Interpretation of Section 213, 4
Va. Tax Rev. 427 (1985).
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received in settlement of personal injury or sickness claims."7 Two
significant problems confront a person wishing to exclude settlement
recoveries. First, in cases involving business-related nonphysical inju-
ries, unless there is a settlement agreement that specifically designates
part or all of the award to personal injury claims, the Service will
treat the entire recovery as taxable. In addition, the recent adminis-
trative ruling18 that punitive damages received in a personal injury
action are taxable has magnified the importance of a specific allocation
between compensatory and punitive damages in the settlement agree-
ment. The Service's current position is that if both compensatory and
punitive damages were sought in the complaint, any settlement must
be allocated between the taxable (punitive) portion and the compen-
satory (nontaxable) component based on the best available evidence of
proper allocation, which (absent an allocation in a settlement agree-
ment) will be the prayer for relief in the complaint. 9 Thus, if the
complaint sought $10,000 in compensatory damages for a physical
personal injury and $90,000 in punitive damages, and if the parties
settle for $10,000 only $1,000 of that amount will be excludable from
income unless there is some better evidence than the complaint as to
the allocation the parties desired.80
a. Employment-related nonphysical injury settlements
Most of the reported decisions concerning the taxability of em-
ployment-related awards involve settlement agreements. To justify an
exclusion of all or part of such an award, a taxpayer must establish
both that his actual or threatened claims involved a personal injury
77. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1986); Treas. Regs. § 1-104-1(c) (1987).
78. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
79. Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51.
80. Although precedent indicates that the parties' allocation will be respected,
caution would dictate that amendment of the complaint to decrease or delete the prayer
for punitive damages, followed by a settlement that is silent as to allocation, should
be avoided as an invitation to the Service to disregard the amendment. But cf. 28 Trial
Law. Guide 309, 310 (1984):
It is suggested that in regard to settlement, counsel withdraw any claim for
punitive damages before entering into settlement, or state in the quittance
papers that no part of the settlement is in payment of punitive damages. It
is unlikely that the government would check every settlement of every personal
injury or wrongful death case and in many cases, where both compensatory
and punitive damages are claimed, settlements are made routinely solely on
the basis of payment of compensatory damages. If in fact an allowance for
punitive damages is not a consideration for settlement, it would seem that
the Government should not be permitted to tax any portion of the settlement
funds, even though claims were alleged for both punitive and compensatory
damages.
[Vol. 48
TAXATION OF DAMAGES
claim, and that part or all of the settlement represents settlement of
the personal injury claim. As to the first inquiry concerning the ex-
istence of a personal injury claim, the validity of the claim is irrele-
vant."' Assuming that the taxpayer can establish the existence of a
personal injury claim, he must then establish that the payment received
was in fact in settlement of such claim. An express allocation in the
settlement agreement of part or all of the recovery to settlement of
the personal injury claim apparently will suffice."2 On the other hand,
a carefully negotiated settlement agreement that allocates no part of
the award to settlement of personal injury claims has been held to
preclude exclusion from income, even though the agreement was later
amended to allocate retroactively part of the settlement to personal
injury claims."'
Rarely does the taxpayer prevail in excluding part of an unallocated
employment-related settlement from income. The immensity of the
taxpayer's burden is exemplified by Seay v. Commissioner,8 4 one of
the few taxpayer victories, and one that provokes skepticism as to
whether any amount of attorney diligence that falls short of an al-
location in a document labeled "settlement agreement" could ever
ensure exclusion under section 104(a)(2). In Seay the taxpayer recovered
$105,000 in settlement of his claims for breach of contract and personal
injuries (embarrassment and harm to personal reputation) arising out
of the termination of his employment. Negotiators representing Seay
and his former employer signed a letter memorializing the settlement
and allocating $45,000 of the $105,000 settlement to Seay's personal
injury claim.85 Three years after the settlement letter was signed, the
general manager of Seay's former employer signed a letter stating that
the nature of the $45,000 payment was correctly designated in the
original settlement letter.8 6
81. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972) ("[W]e hold that the determination
of whether a settlement payment is exempt from taxation depends on the nature of the
claim settled and not on the validity of the claim.").
82. No direct authority exists, but numerous courts have found the absence of an
express allocation to permit or require analysis by the court of other factors. See, e.g.,
Villaume v. United States, 616 F. Supp. 185 (D. Minn. 1985) (no allocation in settlement
agreement; entire recovery held taxable as replacement for compensation); Glynn v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116 (1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982) (unallocated
settlement held to represent recovery of accrued sick leave).
83. Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982), aff'd, 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984).
84. 58 T.C. 32 (1972).
85. The "letter clearly designated the $45,000 payment 'as compensation for such
personal embarrassment, mental and physical strain and injury to health and personal
reputation in the community' as the petitioner had suffered." 58 T.C. at 38.
86. Id.
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Nonetheless, the Service assessed a deficiency, claiming that no
part of the settlement was excludable as a personal injury recovery.
The Tax Court disagreed, finding that the taxpayer had discharged his
duty of establishing that the $45,000 amount was received "on account
of personal injuries":
Under these circumstances, where the chief negotiator for each
party has testified that the payment was for personal injuries
and where there is a letter which has been acquiesced in by
the parties and which states that the payment was for personal
injuries, the petitioner has successfully established that the
nature of the claim was for personal settlement of such claim.8 7
Absent an express allocation in a settlement agreement treated as such
by the Service, 8 8 "the most important fact in determining how section
104(a)(2) is to be applied is 'the intent of the payor' as to the purpose
in making the payment." The opinion of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirming the Tax Court's decision in Agar v. Commissioner9"
appears to be the origin of the "intent of the payor" test. Agar, a
certified public accountant, had served as a corporation's accountant
and treasurer for twelve years. As his retirement approached, 9' the
corporation hired another accountant and appointed Agar to a five-
year term as treasurer. He was also made a director of the corporation.
Shortly thereafter Agar found that the corporation "had lost confidence
in him." 92 Claiming humiliation and damage to his health, Agar threat-
ened suit. The corporation settled, agreeing to pay Agar $45,000 in
three equal annual installments. He excluded these payments from his
gross income, explaining on his return that the recovery was tax-exempt
because it was in settlement of a libel claim. 93
The Commissioner disallowed the exclusion, and the Tax Court
upheld the Commissioner on two grounds:
87. Id.
88. As Seay demonstrates, a document signed by both parties to the settlement
negotiations that expressly allocates the payments to designated claims may not be
respected by the Service.
89. Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 245 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir.
1987) (citing Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965)); Fono v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680, 694 (1982), aff'd, 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984); Glynn v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 120 (1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982).
90. 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961) (aff'g 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1960)).
91. Surprisingly, the record does not reflect Agar's precise age at the time of his
"demotion." The Second Circuit's opinion states that it occurred when he was "63 or
64." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 284.
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first, that the payments were in the nature of severance pay
or extra compensation and not in settlement of a possible tort
claim; the gravamen of that claim was an injury to business
reputation and thus the taxpayer could not rely on the statutory
exemption of payments on account of "personal injuries. ' 94
The Second Circuit affirmed on the first ground, that the payments
were actually extra compensation, and therefore did not reach the
business-reputation versus personal-reputation theory. The court did,
however, question whether the latter "dichotomy is realistic." 95 The
court found that Mr. Agar's belief that the payment was in settlement
of a libel claim was merely "evidence" of the actual nature of the
payment. The "ultimate inquiry," it asserted, was "into the 'basic
reason' for the company's payment. ' 96 Based on the testimony of the
corporation's president that the payments were for "severance," the
Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in favor of the Com-
missioner, notwithstanding that the president did not participate in the
negotiations, that the testimony of the corporation's negotiator (a
lawyer) was not available, and that Mr. Agar firmly believed the
payments were in settlement of his libel claim. 97
b. General Releases
Many, if not most, settlements of employment-related disputes
involve the employee's execution of a general release in exchange for
an agreed-upon monetary payment from the employer. Boilerplate lan-
guage in the release typically specifies that the release is in settlement
of any and all claims, action or causes of action, in law or in equity,
contract or tort. Until the April 1987 decision of the Tax Court in
Metzger v. Commissioner,98 discussed in part I E infra, in every
reported decision involving a settlement agreement containing such a
general release, the employee had been denied an exclusion under
section 104(a)(2) for any portion of the settlement.
A series of cases involving the termination of employment of
professors at Southern Illinois University typifies the generally unre-
ceptive attitude of the courts toward any exclusion from income of
94. Id.
95. Id.; see generally infra Part C.
96. Id.
97. After the settlement was reached, but before the ensuing tax litigation, the
corporation's lawyer died. The Second Circuit appropriately noted that this was "un-
fortunate" for Agar because the lawyer was certainly the individual who was most
familiar with Agar's threatened suit and the reasons for the corporation's payments.
Id.
98. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-1428 (3d Cir., July 16, 1987).
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such recoveries. In 1973 the Illinois Board of Higher Education adopted
a budget for Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (SIUC) that
required a significant reduction in teaching staff. Both tenured and
non-tenured professors were terminated and SIUC negotiated settle-
ments with the terminated individuals. A number of the terminated
professors excluded the settlements from income, and four Tax Court
memorandum decisions99 ensued, each of which concluded that the
general releases' 00 signed by the individuals did not support any ex-
clusion form income. Despite evidence of humiliation and damage to
reputation,10 the courts found that the nature of the claim settled in
each case was essentially contractual, and that the parties' failure to
allocate any portion of the settlement to potential tort claims was fatal
to the taxpayers' position. Each court found it significant that the
settlement award approximated one year's salary; therefore, the courts
reasoned, that the payments were intended as additional compensation
"to forestall'an action for breach of contract."' 10 2
The broad language of the releases, encompassing both tort and
contract claims, was found by one of the courts to be "a matter of
form rather than basic intent."' 03 Another court admitted that the
reference to tort claims in the release is completely ineffective for tax
99. Whitehead v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 365 (1980), aff'd in unpublished
opinion (10th Cir. Nov. 20, 1981); Evans v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 260
(1980); Anderson v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1206 (1979); Gunderson v. Com-
missioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 464 (1979).
100. The releases were substantially identical. Each contained the following language:
I ... in consideration of the payment of the sum of ... have remised,
released and forever discharged, and by these presents do, for myself and for
my heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby release, remise, and
forever discharge the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, its
agents, employees, successors, and assigns, of and from any and all manner
of action or actions, either in law or in equity, contract, tort, or otherwise,
which the undersigned might now have against the Board of Trustees ... ,
and more particularly the claims or demands arising out of the employment
or the lack thereof, as . .. Professor in the Department of ....
Said release is in settlement of any and all claims arising out of the em-
ployment or lack therof of .... It is understood and agreed that this set-
tlement is the compromising of a disputed claim, and that the payment or
any other agreements contained herein shall not be construed as an admission
of liability.
Whitehead, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 367; Evans, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 262; Anderson, 38
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1207; Gunderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 464-65.
101. See, e.g., Anderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1208 ("When the names of those
who were being terminated became public, they were ... ostracized . . . their reputations
were lowered . . . and many of them found difficulty finding other employment at the
same level.").
102. Anderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1208.
103. Id. at 1209.
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purposes absent a specific allocation in the agreement: "Even if pe-
titioner had established . . . that the university regarded a portion of
the settlement as payment for tort or tort-type damages suffered by
petitioner, we would be compelled to reach the same result because
no allocation of the lump-sum payment was made."'' 4
This remarkable statement appears in the same opinion that du-
tifully recites that "[tihe most important fact in making the deter-
mination of the nature of the claim settled is the intent of the payor
in making the settlement payment."'0 5 The rule enunciated by this
court is simply that intent of the payor is determinative, but even if
the taxpayer succeeds in establishing that the payor's intent is to
compensate for a tort claim, the recovery must be included in income
if the settlement agreement contains no specific allocation. Although
this case may be only a slip of the judicial pen, it demonstrates the
near impossibility of establishing the propriety of excluding from in-
come an unallocated settlement of an employment-related dispute. 0 6
C. Defamation Actions: Business Reputation versus Personal
Reputation
Most of the employment-related cases dealing with section 104(a)(2)
involve threatened or actual defamation claims by the taxpayer. Because
the Service has long maintained, and the courts have generally ruled,
that damages for injury to one's business or professional reputation
are not excludable under section 104(a)(2), individuals who recovered
damages for business-related nonphysical injuries such as defamation
or malicious prosecution have been forced to establish that their ex-
clusion of the award from income is proper. The principal difficulty
has been in the oft-repeated distinction between "personal" reputation
and "business" reputation: if the injury appears to have been prin-
104. Whitehead, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 369 (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 368.
106. Additional examples include Madson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 425
(1985) (settlement during appeal of judgment in taxpayer's favor in suit for denial of
equal protection and breach of contract; summary judgment for taxpayer inappropriate
because settlement agreement silent on allocation; notation of "Bodily Injury" on
settlement check inefficient); Nussbaum v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 346, 348
(1982) (None of unallocated settlement of claims arising from termination of taxpayer's
employment excludable; general release of "all claims" not probative of payor's intent
because "[w]e think it highly unlikely that an organization such as the Times would
sign a document in part settling a suit for mental anguish without, protectively, stating
so specifically."); Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 121 (1981), aff'd in unpublished
opinion (1st Cir. 1982) (unallocated settlement arising out of termination of employment
held to be "essentially severance pay," despite reference in agreement to damaged
reputation).
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cipally to one's business reputation, then the recovery is merely a
substitute for lost income and is taxable. Especially prior to the 1984
ruling'0 7 that punitive damages in personal injury actions are not ex-
cludable under section 104(a)(2), the stakes in such cases would be
quite substantial. If the individual recovered both compensatory and
punitive damages, then the entire award would be tax-free if the injury
was found to be personal; if the injury was held to be to one's
"business" reputation, then both the compensatory and punitive dam-
ages would be fully taxable.
The travails of Paul F. Roemer, a California insurance salesman,
and Wade E. Church, then the Arizona Attorney General, dramatically
illustrate the tax impact of the varying definitions of "any damages"
and "personal" injury. Both men recovered substantial damage awards
(both punitive and compensatory) in defamation actions, both excluded
their recoveries from income, and both defended their exclusion in
litigation in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court decided in
Roemer v. Commissioner'°8 that Mr. Roemer's injury was not personal,
and thus that his entire recovery was taxable. Less than ten months
later, however, the Tax Court ruled that Mr. Church properly excluded
his entire recovery from income. 10 9 Shortly after the Church decision,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision
in Roemer. The Service then issued a ruling"0 stating that it would
follow the Tax Court opinion in Roemer, and not the Ninth Circuit's
analysis. In Threlkeld v. Commissioner,"' the Tax Court rejected its
own earlier approach and announced that it will follow the Ninth
Circuit's analysis. The Service has not revoked its ruling, and thus it
continues to follow and apply the analysis of the Tax Court in Roemer,
notwithstanding that the Tax Court itself has disavowed that analysis.
The Threlkeld decision and its effects are discussed in Part 2, infra.
1. Roemer and Church
In 1965, Paul Roemer, an independent insurance broker who pri-
marily sold casualty insurance, applied for an agency license to sell
life insurance. As part of the review of his license application, the
insurance company obtained a credit report on Roemer. The report
was "grossly defamatory,""12 and stated, among other things, that
Roemer neglected his clients' affairs, was ignorant in insurance matters,
107. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
108. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
109. Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
110. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
111. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), appeal docketed, No. 87-1511 (6th Cir., May 26, 1987).
112. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 400.
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intentionally damaged others' property, and had been fired from his
position as president of an insurance firm. The report also implied
that Mr. Roemer had misappropriated funds belonging to others.
Roemer learned of the defamatory credit report and demanded its
retraction. The issuer of the report then distributed a purported re-
traction, in which it further defamed Roemer and questioned his in-
tegrity. Mr. Roemer was denied the agency license and his business
suffered because of the damage to his reputation and the fact that
"most of his friends were also his clients, and vice versa." 3
Roemer sued the issuer of the credit report, alleging that the report
had damaged his reputation as an insurance broker and had caused
him to lose business and profits. At trial, Roemer produced evidence
of his "exemplary background" and good reputation in the insurance
industry. The jury awarded Roemer $40,000 in compensatory damages
and $250,000 in punitive damages. Roemer excluded the recovery from
his income, ' 4 but the Service assessed a deficiency, finding that Roemer
should have included the entire award in his income.
If the defamation were characterized as a personal injury, then
Roemer properly excluded from income both the compensatory award
and the punitive damages, since the Service's position at that time was
that punitive damages received on account of personal injury are ex-
cludable.' 3 On the other hand, if the injury was not personal, then
none of the damages could be excluded under section 104(a)(2). De-
pending on the nature of the injury, therefore, Roemer's recovery of
$290,000 was either fully taxable or completely excludable from his
income.
The Tax Court, in a reviewed" 6 decision, concluded that the com-
pensatory damages were fully taxable because, based on the pleadings
and testimony at trial, "the predominant nature of his claims involved
damages to his business and professional reputation as an insurance
broker."" 7 Having concluded that the $40,000 of compensatory dam-
ages were not awarded for a personal injury, the Tax Court found
the punitive damages similarly includable in income because they were
not awarded on account of a personal injury.
Two dissenting opinions were filed. Judge Forester's opinion, in
which Judge Korner joined, stated that the test for excludability should
113. Id.
114. Actually he reported part of the recovery as income, but took the position in
the Tax Court litigation that none of the damage recovery should have been included
in income. Id. at 403-04.
115. See infra Part III.
116. For an explanation of "reviewed" Tax Court decisions, see supra note 10.
117. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 406.
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be whether there has been injury to reputation or only injury to
occupation. One's reputation is personal, according to Judge Forester,
and any damage to it is a personal injury. Even if the manifestation
of the injury occurs primarily in the individual's occupation, this cannot
alter the personal nature of the injury."' On the other hand, an injury
solely to one's occupation or profession that does not injure one's
reputation is not a personal injury. Applying this test, Judge Forester
found the injury Roemer complained of was to his reputation, and
therefore the damages were properly excluded under section 104(a)(2).
Judge Wilbur also dissented, agreeing with Judge Forester that the
majority erroneously confused Roemer's proof of his damages with
the nature of his injury. Judge Wilbur's opinion noted that lost wages
and diminished earning capacity are almost always used to measure
the damages caused by personal injuries. Nonetheless, Judge Wilbur
stated, the majority's decision will compel "the bifurcation of a def-
amation action into categories corresponding to components of dam-
ages," 1 9 and plaintiffs will be taxed on their recoveries only if their
damages are readily measurable in economic terms.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in Roemer. 20
It rejected the Tax Court's reliance on the pleadings and testimony,
and instead found that state law should determine the characterization
of an injury as personal or nonpersonal. Based upon its thorough
review of the history of defamation, at common law and in the Cal-
ifornia codification, the Ninth Circuit concluded that defamation is a
personal injury, and that compensatory damages recovered were there-
fore excludable under section 104(a)(2).
The court noted the existence of a separate cause of action for
nonpersonal attacks on the quality of one's goods or services. A
plaintiff may have a cause of action for defamation (a personal injury),
or for one of the related torts of trade libel and product disparagement.
Observing that it "is sometimes difficult to draw the line between
disparagement and defamation,"' 2' the court nonetheless concluded that
an individua' 22 who recovers damages in a defamation action may
exclude the recovery under section 104(a)(2).
118. Id. at 411-12 (Forrester, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 414 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
120. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 699.
122. In a footnote, the court acknowledged that corporations may sue for some
types of defamation. Availability of this cause of action to corporations did not, in
the court's view, render it a nonpersonal action, even though corporations cannot suffer
"personal" injury. See id. at 699 n.4.
[Vol. 48
TAXATION OF DAMAGES
Like the dissenting judges in the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit
correctly focused on the distinction between the nature of the injury
itself and not the proof of damages caused by the injury:
[A]II defamatory statements attack an individual's good name.
This injury to the person should not be confused with the
derivative consequences of the defamatory attack, i.e., the loss
of reputation in the community and any resulting loss of in-
come. The nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury, such
as loss of future income, are often the most persuasive means
of proving the extent of the injury that was suffered. The
personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its
effect.123
Having rejected the Tax Court's analysis and determined that the
compensatory damages recovered by Roemer were excludable because
defamation is a personal injury under California law, the Ninth Circuit
found the punitive portion of his award excludable under Revenue
Ruling 75-45.124
Just less than ten months after its decision in Roemer, and two
months before the Ninth Circuit's reversal of Roemer, the Tax Court
handed down its decision in Church v. Commissioner.125 Church had
recovered $250,000 compensatory and $235,000 punitive damages from
a newspaper that had falsely accused him of being a Communist.
Church excluded the recovery from income, and the Service assessed
a deficiency, claiming that the entire recovery was taxable.
Applying the analytical approach it had formulated in Roemer,
the Tax Court stated that "[tlo ascertain the nature of the damages,
it is necessary in this case to examine the allegations contained in
petitioner's original and amended complaints, the evidence presented,
and the arguments made in the State court proceeding."' 12 6 Under this
analysis, the Tax Court concluded that Roemer was "clearly distin-
guishable" because, unlike in Roemer, "the entire thrust of Church's
case was how the libelous editorial affected him personally.' ' 27
In its eagerness to distinguish Roemer, the court candidly but
erroneously stated that courts "have consistently held that amounts
received in lieu of wages, salary, or lost profits are includable in
income.' ' 12 Of course, if the injury is personal, damages for lost income
123. Id. at 699 (emphasis added).
124. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
125. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
126. Id. at 1107.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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or profits should be fully excludable under section 104(a)(2)., 29 The
Service insisted that Roemer was not distinguishable, since the Tax
Court's own test required an analysis of the economic impact of the
injury to determine whether it was personal. Clearly, according to the
Service, the damage to a state Attorney General who is accused of
being a Communist is no more or less personal than the damage to
an insurance broker who is reported to be dishonest and incompetent.
Perhaps foreshadowing its abandonment of its analysis in Roemer, the
Tax Court found that the Service had applied the Roemer "test much
too broadly,"' 30 and reasoned as follows:
It is simply not enough that the injury arose in connection
with the taxpayer's business or his professional endeavor, or
that the injury is somehow remotely "capable" of affecting
his income. Even though the editorial destroyed petitioner's
career as a public servant and it marked the end of a promising
political career, it did not take away his career as an attorney.
Moreover, to the extent petitioner's professional reputation was
damaged, we find no basis for distinguishing between that
injury and the mental distress, pain, and suffering that flowed
therefrom. That he was a public figure simply compounded
the pain. In our opinion, shattered dreams, ruined careers, and
the mental anguish that follow are just as personal as, for
instance, loss of limb.' 3'
Roemer and his attorney certainly must have been stunned. Roemer's
use of readily available evidence of measurable economic damages,
which apparently Church did not have, was the only meaningful dis-
tinction between the two cases. Rather than abandoning the Roemer
analysis, however, the Tax Court defended it and claimed to have
applied it, with the result that two individuals who suffered almost
identical injuries were subject to polar opposite income tax treatment,
with the only difference being the methods of pleading and proving
damages.
The Roemer and Church decisions prompted several administrative
rulings on the taxation of personal injury recoveries and exacerbated
the confusion concerning the meaning of a "personal" injury under
section 104(a)(2) of the Code. The first administrative ruling involved
the excludability of punitive damages in personal injury actions. In
Revenue Ruling 84-108,132 the Service declared that damages charac-
129. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50 (damages for lost earnings excludable).
130. Church, 80 T.C. at 1109 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
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terized under state law as punitive were includable in income. Part III
of this article analyzes this issue.
The Service also rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Roemer
and espoused the Tax Court's approach to the determination of whether
an injury is personal. In Revenue Ruling 85-143,113 the Service stated
that the characterization of the nature of the injury under state law
is not determinative. Instead, whether a defamatory statement caused
a personal injury is to be determined by "the thrust of the petitioner's
case. '1 3 4 If "the main thrust of the evidence" is "of lost business
income," the Service stated, the injury is not a personal injury, re-
gardless of state law, and all damages recovered are fully taxable. 35
Thus, although state law characterization of damage recoveries as
punitive in nature will now result in automatic taxation of such re-
coveries under Revenue Ruling 84-108, the state law characterization
of the nature of the injury itself is irrelevant, according to the Service.
Instead, the party's pleadings and proof will control the taxability of
his recovery.
2. Threlkeld v. Commissioner: An About-Face
On December 8, 1986 the Tax Court issued its reviewed opinion
in Threlkeld v. Commissioner36 in which the court, after reviewing
precedents from the 1922 Solicitor's Opinion" 7 up to and including
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roemer, declared that the Ninth Circuit's
approach is correct. Henceforth, according to the court,
the approach that we will now apply in all cases, whether [sic-
where] the injury claimed is personal, more accurately reflects
the inquiry required by the plain meaning of the statute. Ex-
clusion under section 104 will be appropriate if compensatory
damages are received on account of any invasion of the rights
that an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in
the sight of the law.'38
Although the court acknowledged only that it was denying the validity
of distinguishing between "business" reputation and "personal" rep-
utation, its holding implicitly overrides decades of precedent in which
the courts have determined the nature of the injury by inquiring into
whether the damages were a substitute for lost income.
133. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) appeal docketed, No. 87-1511 (6th Cir., May 26, 1987).
137. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
138. Threlkeld. 87 T.C. at 1308.
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At issue in Threlkeld was the excludability of a pre-trial settlement
of a suit for malicious prosecution. Threlkeld's complaint sought com-
pensatory damages of $250,000 and punitive damages of $1,000,000.
Prior to trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant
to which they settled the malicious prosecution suit and Threlkeld
released the other party from all other pending claims. Threlkeld was
to receive $300,000 in settlement, $75,000 of which was allocated to
compensate for damage to his professional reputation. In 1980, the
tax year in question, Threlkeld received $86,000 of the total settlement,
of which $21,500 represented payment for injury to his professional
reputation. Threlkeld excluded this portion of the recovery from in-
come, and the Commissioner assessed a deficiency, asserting that dam-
ages for injury to professional reputation are not excludable under
section 104(a)(2).
The court stated that, after "careful consideration" of the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Roemer, and after "close scrutiny of all of our
decisions in this area," it had concluded that, "for purposes of section
104(a)(2), there is no justification for continuing to draw a distinction,
in tort actions, between damages received for injury to personal rep-
utation and damages received for injury for professional reputation. '1 39
The court found that in determining excludability under section 104(a)(2),
"the beginning and the end of the inquiry" is the determination of
whether the amounts are damages for personal injuries. 40
Significantly, the court acknowledged the conceptual error of con-
fusing the nature of the injury with the consequences that flow from
it. Although the Threlkeld court never mentioned the influence of the
Raytheon "in lieu of what" analysis on its prior decisions, it con-
vincingly repudiated it:
[Tihe extent to which income is decreased, even though this
may be the best measure of loss, in no way changes the nature
of the claim. "It is simply not enough that the injury arose
in connection with the taxpayer's business or his professional
endeavor, or that the injury is somehow remotely capable of
affecting his income." ... Where . . . a taxpayer's injuries
are nonphysical we have, in the past, ignored the personal
nature of the claim and delved into an inquiry regarding the
nature of the consequences of the injury.' 41
Having rejected the consequence-oriented analysis, the court determined
that the question whether an injury is personal can only be determined
139. Id. at 1298.
140. Id. at 1299.
141. Id. at 1299-1301 (quoting Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1109 (1983)).
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by a consideration of "all the facts and circumstances.' ' 142 The ap-
propriate criterion in cases where there is a court judgment or an
allocated settlement agreement is "the nature of the claim as defined
under State law.' 1 43 On the other hand, the court stated:
State law may be of limited assistance where, in a settlement,
the claim settled is itself unclear. Similarly, State law is of
little help where there are several claims, only some of which
are for personal injuries. The State law classification of the
various claims will be of no assistance in identifying the claim
or claims or in carving up the damage recovery. In such cases
we must look to various factors, including the allegations in
the State court pleadings, the evidence adduced at trial, a
written settlement agreement, and the intent of the payor. In
a given case any one of these factors may be ultimately per-
suasive or ignored. 44
Applying this analysis, the court noted that the parties had entered a
written settlement agreement specifically allocating a fixed sum to
injuries to Threlkeld's professional reputation arising out of an alleged
malicious prosecution. The court observed that "the specific allocation
in the settlement agreement does not necessarily control in deciding
whether the claim being settled arises from a personal injury.' ' '4 In-
stead, the state law characterization of the cause of action for malicious
prosecution controls. Finding that Tennessee law treats an action for
malicious prosecution as a personal injury action,' 46 the court held that
"all of the compensatory damages received by petitioner in settlement
of his claim for malicious prosecution, including those allocated by
the settlement agreement as compensation for injuries to professional
reputation, are excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2).' ' 47
D. Recoveries for Civil Rights Violations
One obvious group of potential beneficiaries of the Threlkeld anal-
ysis are recipients of money damages under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964148 and other civil rights provisions. Until very
142. Id. at 1308.
143. Id. at 1306.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1307.
146. The court cited cases recognizing the existence of the tort and its elements
under Tennessee law, and based its conclusion that the action is one for personal injury
on the fact that the one-year statute of limitations under Tennessee law for personal
injury actions had been held to apply to malicious prosecution actions. Id. (cases cited).
147. 87 T.C. at 1308.
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(h)6 (1981).
19881
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
recently, the Service and the courts have refused to view money damages
for prohibited employment discrimination as damages for "personal
injuries," and have focused instead on the nexus between the damage
awards (typically back pay or front pay) and the recipient's otherwise
taxable earnings. Two recent Tax Court cases, Bent v. Commissioner1
49
and Metzger v. Commissioner,5 ' reverse this analysis and sanction
exclusion from income of Title VII and section 1983111 awards. Sig-
nificantly, however, the most recent Tax Court decision, Thompson
v. Commissioner,5 2 appears to signal a retreat from Bent and Metzger.
Both Bent and Metzger were appealed to the Third Circuit, which has
affirmed the Bent decision, and an appeal of the Tax Court's decision
in Thompson is likely. Careful analysis of the issue is therefore war-
ranted.
1. Early Attitudes
The Service's first official ruling on the question of Title VII
monetary awards is Revenue Ruling 72-341,113 which did not mention
section 104(a)(2). The ruling considered the tax consequences of money
damages received by a group of individuals following a Title VII suit
brought by the United States Government against the individuals' em-
ployer. The ruling stated that the "amount paid to each employee was
based on a formula that took into account the difference between his
actual earnings while in the employ of the corporation, and what his
earnings would have been had he not been discriminated against.'
'15 4
The Service concluded that the awards were includable in the recipients'
income under section 61 as "compensation."' 55
The only authority the Service cited was a 1941 Supreme Court
decision, Hort v. Commissioner,5 6 in which the Court held that a
payment received by a lessor from a lessee for cancellation of a lease
was taxable as ordinary income. The lessor had maintained that the
payment was a nontaxable return of capital. The ruling correctly notes
that the Supreme Court "looked to the nature of the item for which
the damages were a substitute" and determined that what the lessor
had received was a substitute for rent. 1 7 Because the rental payments,
149. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
150. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-1428 (3d Cir. July 16, 1987).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
152. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), appeal docketed, Nos. 88-3801 and 88-3924 (4th Cir. Jan.
6, 1988 and Jan. 28, 1988) (consolidated).
153. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 313 U.S. 28, 61 S. Ct. 757 (1941).
157. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32.
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if received, would have been taxable as ordinary income, the Court
reasoned that the payment by the lessee to cancel the lease was similarly
taxable.
Hort, an obvious precursor of the "in lieu of what" test, provides
an answer only to the taxability of an award that is not governed by
section 104(a)(2). The statute demands, however, that the threshold
inquiry be made to determine whether the injury is "personal." The
question that must be answered is not whether money damages in Title
VII actions are a substitute for compensation, but instead whether
discriminatory employment practices constitute "personal injuries."
The few courts that have considered this issue generally have been
no more receptive to the notion of excludability than the Service. In
Hodge v. Commissioner,"' the Tax Court summarily rejected Hodge's
contention that a recovery for discriminatory employment practices is
a personal injury recovery excludable under section 104(a)(2). For the
court in Hodge, the analysis began and ended with its finding that
the award represented back pay. The court's inscrutable reasoning is
contained in a footnote:
Petitioner cites a number of cases to support his argument that
any amount recovered in a discrimination suit is excluded from
income under sec. 104(a)(2), even if it is designated back pay.
These cases are not in point because they involve an entirely
different issue which we need not reach in this case, namely,
whether, as a matter of law, amounts recovered under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 may constitute personal injury damages
within the meaning of sec. 104(a)(2). We have concluded that
back pay recovered under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
taxable; in the second issue of this case, we decided that the
entire amount recovered by the petitioner is, in fact, back pay.
In the second issue, had we decided, as a matter of fact, that
a portion of the recovery constituted personal injury damages
instead of back pay, we would have also had to decide whether
such recovery was excludable from gross income under sec.
104(a)(2). In view of our holding, we need not reach this
issue. 1 9
One can only speculate how many plaintiffs' attorneys and their clients
were persuaded by the Hodge court's circular "reasoning" that it simply
was not worth it to pursue the issue.
158. 64 T.C. 616 (1975).
159. Id. at 619 n.7 (emphasis added).
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In 1980 the Court of Claims (now the Claims Court), 60 in Watkins
v. United States,'6' gave equally summary treatment to the question
of whether Title VII awards are excludable. As the Tax Court had
done in Hodge, the Court of Claims concluded that the recovery "was
gross income because it was a back pay award.' ' 62 Faced with this
apparent unanimity among the Service and the courts with special tax
expertise (the Tax Court and Claims Court), some courts responded
with creative solutions. Finding it inequitable that plaintiffs be forced
to pay a significant portion of their lump-sum recovery in taxes, and
operating on the premise that a Title VII recovery is taxable, one
federal district court concluded that "equity requires making a tax
component a part of the back pay formula.' 63
Another federal district court took a novel approach. To ensure that the
settlement award it approved would be tax-exempt, the court held that the
award was a payment "to avoid the further costs and uncertainties of liti-
gation," and was not, therefore, "a settlement of wage claims.' ' 64
The court reasoned as follows:
160. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
27 (1982), created a new Article I court, the United States Claims Court, that has
essentially the same jurisdiction as the Trial Division of the former Court of Claims.
That same Act also created a new appellate court, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, which is an Article III court that inherited the appellate
jurisdiction of the former Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals.
161. 223 Ct. Cl. 731 (1980).
162. Id.
163. Sears v. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1084, 31 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33, 388 (D. Kan. 1982), aff'd, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
783 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1216 (1985). The
court noted the unfairness of taxing in a single year a recovery that should have been
received over a number of years. In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit
focused on the shortcomings of the then-available income averaging provisions to provide
complete relief to all the class members:
The court-ordered back pay awards will likely place the living members of
the class in the highest income tax bracket on much of the back pay they
now receive. Even if the class members income average, they can not only
consider the three years preceding the computation year. Apparently nearly
40% of the class members have died. Estates of deceased taxpayers are not
eligible for income averaging .... We believe the trial court's inclusion of
the tax component was an appropriate exercise of its discretion in the instant
case.
Sears, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 787. The repeal of the old income averaging
provisions, I.R.C. §§ 1031-1035, by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will compound this
unfairness. Tax Reform Act of 1986 section 141(a).
164. Sweet v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 804,
813 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
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While this Court is familiar with the revenue rulings which
hold that, under certain circumstances, amounts paid in set-
tlement of employment discrimination claims are wages, this
Court holds them to be inapposite and not controlling in this
case. This is not a case where the monetary award has been
designated by the court, by the agreement or by law as back
pay or wages. Nor is this a case where the agreement is silent
on the nature of the award. This court has spoken on the
nature of this award and declares it not to be "wages" ....
The fact that the awards are not "wages" does not necessarily
mean that they are not excludable as income to the class
members .... After examining the settlement agreement. . . , this
Court concludes that the awards are not includable as gross income
to the class members. 6
5
Despite its dubious enforceability, this decision vividly illustrates the
problem. If the designation of an award as back pay results in certain
taxability, then any settlement should be designated by the parties and
confirmed by the court as "in the nature of damages, not wages.
'
'
66
Whether such precautions are necessary is currently unclear. In
Bent v. Commissioner, 67 a decision filed nearly five months before
Threlkeld, the Tax Court appeared to abandon the wages-oriented "in
lieu of what" analysis, and in Metzger v. Commissioner,68 filed April
9, 1987, the Tax Court reaffirmed the Threlkeld and Bent analysis in
the context of a settlement of multiple actions based on federal and
state antidiscrimination provisions. Although Threlkeld, Bent, and
Metzger seem to signal a complete reversal of the Tax Court's refusal
to analyze whether employment-related awards may be excludable as
damages recovered for personal injuries, the Tax Court's most recent
decision on this issue, Thompson v. Commissioner,'69 relies on Hodge
and unabashedly reaffirms the "in lieu of what" test. An examination
of these decisions follows.
2. Bent v. Commissioner (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Bent, a high school teacher, sued under 42 United States Code
section 1983,170 alleging that the local school board's decision not to
165. Id. at 814.
166. Id.
167. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
168. 88 T.C. 834, appeal docketed, No. 87-1428 (3d Cir., July 16, 1987).
169. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), appeal docketed, Nos. 88-3801 and 88-3924 (4th Cir. Jan.
6, 1988 and Jan. 28, 1988) (consolidated).
170. At the time Bent was fired, section 1983 provided as follows:
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rehire him constituted an impermissible abridgement of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech. After the trial court's finding
of liability on the section 1983 claim, the parties settled. Bent excluded
the settlement recovery from his income, and the Tax Court upheld
the exclusion as proper under section 104(a)(2).
The Bent court first noted that the "essential" element of an
exclusion under section 104(a)(2) is that the damages must derive from
''some sort of tort (or tort-type) claim against the payor.'' 7' It then
examined the Supreme Court cases analyzing the legislative history of
section 1983 in order to "ascertain the nature of a sec. 1983 claim. '1 7 2
In holding the recovery excludable, the Bent court relied on the Supreme
Court's 1985 decision in Wilson v. Garcia,73 in which the Supreme
Court concluded that "Section 1983 claims are best characterized as
personal injury actions," 74 as well as the Court's earlier pronouncement
that section 1983 "was intended to [create] a species of tort liability. 1 7
The Bent court acknowledged that the recovery compensated Bent for
lost earnings, but held that this was "only an evidentiary factor''1 76
in computing the damages and did not alter the fact that the damages
compensated Bent for a personal injury.
On December 15, 1987 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the Tax Court decision in Bent. The court characterized Judge Chabot's
opinion as "well-reasoned" and stated that it was "in accord with the
reasoning and conclusions of Judge Chabot."'' 77 The court quoted the
Church opinion for the proposition that not all personal injuries are
physical injuries, 17s and quoted the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Roemer
for the idea that "[tihe relevant distinction that should be made is
between personal and nonpersonal injuries, not between physical and
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. 1983 (prior to 1979 amendement). According to the Tax Court, subsequent
amendments to section 1983 did not apply. Bent, 87 T.C. at 245, n.7.
171. 87 T.C. at 244.
172. Id. at 246.
173. 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
174. 87 T.C. at 248 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938,
1947 (1985)).
175. Id. at 249 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253, 98 S. Ct. 1042,
1047 (1978)).
176. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
177. Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 68 (3d Cir. 1987).
178. Id. at 70 (quoting Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104 (1983)).
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nonphysical injuries.''' 7 9 The court then rejected the Commissioner's
argument that the damages were taxable based on lost compensation,
quoting Roemer for the proposition that the "personal nature of an
injury should not be defined by its effect."' 80
Combining the Bent holding and analysis with the Threlkeld de-
cision's statement that "in all cases" involving an alleged personal
injury exclusion will be permitted if the recovery compensates for "any
invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being
a person in the sight of the law,' ' 18 1 one must conclude that the long-
standing refusal to permit exclusion of Title VII recoveries is in jeop-
ardy. Indeed, very recently, in Metzger v. Commissioner,'82 the Tax
Court reaffirmed and expanded its Bent holding to include monetary
damages recovered in settlement of various civil rights claims, including
specifically a Title II claim. More recently, however, in Thompson v.
Commissioner,'83 the Tax Court retreated from this position and found
a recovery under both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act taxable. An
analysis of the Metzger and Thompson decisions follows.
3. Metzger v. Commissioner (Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Metzger, a college professor of Cuban national origin, was denied
tenure despite a favorable recommendation by her department chair-
man. She then brought four actions before state and federal agencies
and courts, alleging that the college's denial of tenure constituted a
breach of contract and violation of her constitutional and statutory
rights to be free from discrimination based on her gender or national
origin. Following a finding by the federal Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission that there was reasonable cause to believe that the
college discriminated against her based on her gender, the parties
settled.
The settlement agreement recited that the college would pay Metzger
$75,000 in settlement of all her claims against the college, including
both the breach of contract claims and those for violations of her
civil rights. The agreement designated one-half her settlement amount
as wages, but characterized this designation as having been made solely
179. Id. (quoting Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983)).
180. Id. (quoting Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 699 (9th Cir. 1983)).
181. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986) appeal docketed, No.
87-1511 (6th Cir. May 26, 1987).
182. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-1428 (3d Cir. July 16, 1987).
183. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), appeal docketed, Nos. 88-3801 and 88-3924 (4th Cir. Jan.
6, 1988 and Jan. 28, 1988) (consolidated).
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"for tax purposes. 1 1' 4 Metzger excluded half the recovery from income,
and the Service assessed a deficiency, asserting that the entire recovery
was includable in her income.
The Tax Court, in an opinion by Judge Chabot, upheld Metzger's
exclusion under the principles enunciated in Bent and Threlkeld. Under
the approach outlined in Threlkeld, Judge Chabot first determined
what claims the agreement settled. After reviewing the various actions
and agency proceedings initiated by Metzger, the court concluded
that the settlement payment was made on condition that pe-
titioner release her claims against the college based on a breach
of contract, and on discrimination of the basis of sex and
national origin in violation of petitioner's rights under the 13th
and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, in
violation of several Federal statutes and Executive Orders, and
in violation of a State statute.18 5
The court next addressed the allocation of one-half the settlement
amount to "wage claims" and found that the agreement's character-
ization of this allocation as being "for tax purposes only" amounted
to a "disavowal" that "vitiate[d] the allocation."' 8 6 Significantly, Judge
Chabot specifically found further that even if he were to respect the
allocation,
that would not advance the analysis; we still would have to
examine the nature of the claims petitioner asserted and which
petitioner and the college settled. In particular, we would have
to determine whether the "wage claims" were an independent
basis for recovery or were an evidentiary factor in determining
the amount by which petitioner was damaged as a result of
personal injuries which the college assertedly caused.'8 7
Thus, even if the allocation were respected, it would not determine
whether the amount labeled as settling "wage claims" is taxable,
because the categories created ("wage claims" versus "all other claims")
"cut across the statutory categories ('damages received ... on account
of personal injuries' and damages received on account of other mat-
ters).'"s
184. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 842. The college wanted to treat the entire $75,000 as
wages subject to withholding taxes in order to comply with its withholding obligations.
Metzger preferred that as little as possible be withheld.
185. Id. at 849.
186. Id. at 850.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 849.
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Having found that the allocation in the settlement agreement should
be ignored, the court next determined the intent of the payor, as
evidenced in various settlement documents and testimony of represen-
tatives of the college.189 The court found that the college intended to
settle all the issues raised by Metzger in the various state and federal
proceedings. 190 Analytically, then, the next step was to determine the
nature of the various claims settled.
Of the four state and federal actions instituted by Metzger, one
(a suit brought in state court) alleged only breach of contract with no
allegations of personal injuries. The remaining three, according to
Judge Chabot, each involved alleged personal injuries. First, in a
suit brought in federal court, Metzger sought redress under 41
United States Code sections 1981,191 1982,192 1983,191 1985(3), 19' and
189. Id. at 850.
190. Id.
191. Section 1981 provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of personal and property as is employed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
192. Section 1982 provides as follows:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
193. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. 1983 (1982).
194. Section 1985(3) provides as follows:
(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
.. . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in futherance of the object
of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
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1986,' 9, claiming that the college's actions violated her thirteenth and four-
teenth amendment rights to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex
or national origin. Relying on the Bent holding that suits under section
1983 are personal injury actions, the court analyzed the remaining
claims under sections 1981, 1982, 1985(3), and 1986 and concluded
that "these claims also are in the nature of personal injury claims to
which section 104(a)(2) applies. 1 96
Metzger also instituted state and federal agency actions alleging
discrimination in employment based on sex and national origin. As to
her title VII charge filed with the federal Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, the court noted the "extensive comparison" of
section 1981 and Title VII by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc. 97 and concluded that, as applied to the facts of
this case, Metzger's Title VII claims "are as much [claims for] personal
injuries as those for which petitioner sought relief in the Federal Court
proceeding.' 98 The court also found that Metzger's state agency action
for prohibited employment discrimination was in the nature of a per-
sonal injury claim. 199
Unfortunately, the Metzger court struggled to distinguish Hodge,
in which it had held that back pay awards under Title VII are not
excludable, and in so doing undermined its own previous insistence
that the labeling of an award as compensating for lost wages does not
control its treatment under section 104(a)(2). Unwilling to declare Hodge
erroneously decided, Judge Chabot simply compared the holding and
analysis of Hodge to the decisions in Bent and Threlkeld, and found
that Hodge could not have held what it appeared to hold. After noting
that in Hodge, "[w]e held that back pay is, by its nature, compensation
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
195. Section 1986 provides as follows:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be
done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed,
and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,
neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be
liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused
by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have
prevented. . . . But no action under the provisions of this section shall be
sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action
has accrued.
42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982).
196. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 852.
197. 421 U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975).
198. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 856.
199. Id. at 858.
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includable in income, ' 200 Judge Chabot inexplicably balked at taking
the next logical step.
We conclude that Hodge does not stand for the proposition
that no damages received as a result of a proceeding under
title VII are excludable under section 104(a)(2). Rather, ex-
cludability depends on what was the injury complained of, and
the loss of income may merely be "an evidentiary factor"
(Bent) or "the best measure of loss" (Threlkeld). In any event,
Hodge is distinguishable from the instant case, in that, in the
instant case (1) the evidence is clear that no effort was made
to calculate the amount of back pay, (2) the evidence is clear
that the college and petitioner sought to settle all the claims
for a single lump sum, (3) the college believed that petitioner's
contract claim might result in a liability of $15-20,000, and
(4) most of petitioner's claims were tort or tort-type claims on
account of personal injuries and were not for back pay, while
Hodge's claim, as we have noted, was only for a back pay
differential.2"'
Thus, although the court found that Metzger's Title VII claim was in
the nature of a personal injury claim, it refused to concede that all
monetary recoveries under Title VII were excludable from income. The
Metzger decision appears to endorse the proposition that a recovery
of back pay in a Title VII action is not excludable under section
104(a)(2) if back pay is actually calculated by the parties and the
recipient alleges no claims for personal injuries other than the claim
of employment discrimination. The Tax Court's recent decision in
Thompson v. Commissioner,20 2 discussed at part 4 infra, considers the
question of back pay awarded under the Equal Pay Act.
At least one category of Title VII cases, those involving sexual
harassment or other "hostile work environment" claims, should always
result in awards that are excludable under section 104(a)(2). In Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 20 3 the Supreme Court recently rejected the
notion that Title VII provides redress only for "tangible," "economic"
losses as opposed to 'purely psychological aspects of the workplace
environment.' 20 4 At issue in Meritor was whether sexual harassment
is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Court
held that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving
200. Id. at 857.
201. Id. at 858.
202. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), appeal docketed, Nos. 88-3801 and 88-3924 (4th Cir. Jan.
6, 1988 and Jan. 28, 1988) (consolidated).
203. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
204. 106 S. Ct. at 2404.
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that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment. ' 20 5 The hostile work environment theory of recovery,
under which the plaintiff need not establish any economic loss, has
been applied in cases involving national origin, 206 race, 20 7 and religion. 208
The Supreme Court in Meritor noted and endorsed the broad appli-
cability of the hostile work environment theory, and Title VII's ap-
plicability "beyond the economic aspects of employment" to protect
employees' emotional and psychological stability. 20 9
Title VII recoveries based on the hostile work environment theory,
in which no economic loss need be shown, clearly qualify for exclusion
under section 104(a)(2), because the nature of the claim is a tort-type
personal injury. It is certainly arguable as well that all Title VII
recoveries, including those designated as back pay, are excludable. In
any Title VII action, the plaintiff's recovery is based on prohibited
discrimination, which, under the Threlkeld standard, is an "invasion
of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being a person
in the sight of the law." ' 21 0
4. Thompson v. Commissioner (Equal Pay Act)
In its most recent pronouncement on the scope of section 104(a)(2),
Thompson v. Commissioner,'21 1 the Tax Court adopted the rationale
suggested by the Metzger court in its effort to distinguish Hodge and
held that back pay awarded under the Equal Pay Act 21 2 was not
excludable under section 104(a)(2). On the other hand, the Thompson
court found that liquidated damages received by the taxpayer pursuant
to an Equal Pay Act provision 1 3 authorizing liquidated damages equal
to 100% of the back pay award is excludable from income because it
is a recovery for a personal injury.
Thompson was the lead plaintiff in a class action sex discrimination
suit brought by women bindery workers against the United States
205. 106 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
206. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977);
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S. Ct.
2058 (1972).
207. Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819, 98 S. Ct. 60 (1977).
208. Compton v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
209. 106 S. Ct. at 2405.
210. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), appeal docketed, No. 87-1511
(6th Cir., May 26, 1987).
211. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), appeal docketed, Nos. 88-3801 and 88-3924 (4th Cir. Jan.
6, 1988 and Jan. 28, 1988) (consolidated).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1987).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1987).
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Government Printing Office. The class sued and recovered under both
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Thompson was one of a sub-class
of workers who recovered under the Equal Pay Act. The entire class
received partial recovery under Title VII, but the prevailing Equal Pay
Act class members were not permitted to share in the back pay com-
ponent of the Title VII award. Thus, the only issue before the Thomp-
son court was the excludability of damages under the Equal Pay Act. 214
Thompson asserted that her entire recovery, both the back pay
award and the liquidated damages award, was excludable under the
holding and analysis of Threlkeld. She maintained that she received
these amounts "because of invasions of the rights granted to her by
virtue of being a person."2 15 The court summarized Thompson's po-
sition as follows:
Her argument is in effect that the payment was not based on
a contract, expressed or implied, and that any amount received
as the result of a suit which is not based on a contractual
right is received as damages granted to the individual by virtue
of being a person.216
The Service, of course, took the position that the entire recovery was
taxable because it represented wages.
The court stated that Thompson "interprets our decision in Threlk-
eld v. Commissioner ...far too broadly. ' '217 Thompson claimed that
her recovery was for prohibited sex discrimination, which is in the
nature of a tort. Rejecting this claim, the court stated:
[Tihere is nothing in Threlkeld v. Commissioner ... that con-
verts a claim for back pay, because an individual has been
underpaid for the work he has done, into a claim for damages
for personal injury merely because the suit which involves such
a claim may also have involved a tort-type action for personal
injuries. 218
The court then approvingly cited Hodge for the proposition that back
pay is in the nature of wages and therefore not excludable under
section 104(a)(2). Finally, the court stated that "the question to be
214. A small portion of Thompson's recovery was awarded under Title VII for
deprivation of opportunity for promotion. The court stated that "since the burden is
on petitioner to show that any portion of the back pay was not granted under the
Equal Pay Act we will treat the matter as if it was all received under the Equal Pay
Act." 89 T.C. at -.
215. 89 T.C. at -.
216. Id.
217. Id. at -.
218. Id. at __.
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asked is 'in lieu of what were th damages awarded.' If the conclusion
is that the payment is in lieu of wages, the payment is not excludable
under section 104(a)(2)." 2 9 The court concluded that the back pay
award was not damages for personal injury, but instead a "payment
for work" and not excludable.
On the other hand, the liquidated damages Thompson received
pursuant to the Equal Pay Act were held to be excludable. The court
noted that if Thompson had received this amount under either Title
VII or section 1983, the recovery would "be held to be damages for
personal injury" 220 under the Metzger and Bent holdings. This statement
appears to undermine the court's holding concerning back pay, where
the court's focus was more on the "in lieu of what" test than on the
nature of the claim. Again the message is clear that although the
federal antidiscrimination provisions provide redress for tort-type in-
juries, any recovery that is purely for back pay will be found taxable.
The court noted that the liquidated damages had been held to be
compensatory rather than penal in nature, and that they were intended
to compensate for intangible losses that were difficult to measure.
According to the court, "[tihis is a further indication that the liquidated
damages are intended as compensation for the sex discrimination which
is a personal injury." '22' Thus, even though the liquidated damages are
measured by the amount of back pay awarded, they are nevertheless
awarded as damages for personal injury and are therefore excludable.
5. Back Pay and Employer Withholding
Employers are required to withhold from an employee's "wages"
statutory minimum amounts of federal income and other taxes, in-
cluding the social security tax imposed pursuant to the Federal Insur-
ance Contributions Act (FICA)222 and that imposed by the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). 223 Both the federal income tax with-
holding provision 224 and the FICA and FUTA withholding provisions 225
are based on "wages" paid by the employer to the employee. When
an employer makes a back pay or front pay award to an employer
pursuant to a settlement or judgment in an action under Title VII,
219. Id. at - (citing Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982), aff'd, 749 F.2d
37 (9th Cir. 1984)).
220. Id. at
221. Id. at - .
222. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3126 (1986).
223. I.R.C. § 3306 (1986).
224. I.R.C. § 3401 (1986).
225. I.R.C. § 3121 (1986) (FICA); I.R.C. § 3306 (1986) (FUTA).
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the Equal Pay Act or any other antidiscrimination provision, should
the employer withhold FICA and federal income tax?
The Service takes the position that "wages," for purposes of all
three withholding provisions, includes back pay awards. 226 In a 1946
decision, the Supreme Court held that a back pay award under the
National Labor Relations Act to a wrongfully discharged employee
constituted "wages" for FICA purposes. 227 Very recently, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case in which the taxpayer
conceded that his back pay recovery in a settlement of a Title VII
action was taxable income and constituted "wages" for purpose of
FICA and FUTA. In Bowman v. United States221 the Sixth Circuit
concluded that for FICA purposes, the award should be allocated to
the years to which the back pay relates, rather than the year in which
it is actually paid by the employer. 229
No court has confronted the issue whether a back pay award that
is held excludable from income under section 104(a)(2) is nonetheless
"wages" for withholding purposes. Because some back pay awards
may be excludable from income, at least under the Tax Court's analysis
in Metzger, the interplay between the withholding provisions and section
104(a)(2) is certain to result in litigation.
E. Tortious Breach of Contract
The recent trend 230 toward imposition of tort liability in some types
of suits for breach of contract could create serious analytical difficulties
in separating taxable recoveries from nontaxable awards. For many
years, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
has supported recoveries of punitive damages in insurance contract
cases in which the insurer is shown to have acted in bad faith.23 '
Recently, some courts have imported this "bad faith" tort into other
contexts, most notably for purposes of this discussion, the employment
context. 32 Some courts have even upheld the award of punitive damages
in arbitration.233 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently found that
226. Rev. Rul. 80-364, 1980-2 C.B. 294.
227. Social Security Bd. v. Neirotko, 327 U.S. 358, 66 S. Ct. 637 (1946).
228. 824 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1987).
229. Id. at 530.
230. For an excellent discussion of this trend, see Note, Tort Remedies for Breach
of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 377 (1986).
231. See, e.g., id. at 381-84 (cases cited).
232. See id. at 384-86 (cases cited); S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions: Liability and
Damages ch. 11.
233. See Jones, Win Punitive Damages in Arbitration, 47 A.B.A. J. 86 (May 1,
1987).
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one state's law permitting punitive damages for "bad faith" breach
of contracts, although "identified" by the state supreme court with
insurance actions, applies to any action for breach of contract. 23 4
Individuals who recover extra-contractual damages in such cases ar-
guably can exclude the damages attributable to the tort element of the
recovery under section 104(a)(2).
Because most recoveries for tortious breach of contract are punitive
damages, the recipient must overcome two obstacles to exclusion under
section 104(a)(2): first, he must establish that the award is on account
of a personal injury; second, he must contend with the Service's current
position that punitive damages are never excludable under section
104(a)(2). Recoveries for tortious breach of contract both epitomize
the analytical problems created by section 104(a)(2) and provide a
convenient crystallization of the fundamental policy issues. Despite the
absence of detailed legislative history, it is highly unlikely that Congress
in 1918 intended to sanction exclusion from income of recoveries for
tortious breach of contract. 23" Nonetheless, because they necessarily
involve a finding of tortious conduct, such recoveries are excludable
under a literal reading of the statute and its implementing regulations.
Perhaps because such recoveries are increasingly frequent and are usu-
ally punitive, the Service could bolster its efforts to ban punitive
recoveries from the section 104(a)(2) exclusion by litigating a case
involving punitive damages for tortious breach of contract. Such a
case would strip the decades of ill-considered precedent and present
the issues in their starkest form. First, is a recovery for tortious breach
of contract, which is based upon (in the words of the regulation) a
"tort or tort-type right" a personal injury within the meaning of section
104(a)(2)? If it is, are punitive damages recovered for the tortious
breach excludable under section 104(a)(2)? This article suggests that
the answer to the first question is "yes," and that Congress should
amend section 104(a)(2) so that the answer to the second question is
"no, if the damages were awarded only to punish the wrongdoer and
not to compensate the victim."
III. ARE PUNITIVE DAMAGES EXCLUDABLE? SHOULD THEY BE?
The same analytical approach that led courts to determine whether
an injury was personal by inquiring whether the damages recovered
234. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (1987) (construing
Mississippi law).
235. But cf. id. (noting that "[als early as 1915 the Mississippi Supreme Court had
recognized that punitive damages were available in a contract case when 'the act or
omission constituting the breach of the contract amounts also to the commission of a
tort.'') (citation omitted).
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were in lieu of earnings has led the Service to conclude that punitive
damages are never excludable under section 104(a)(2). Relying on dicta
in footnote 8 of the Supreme Court's decision in Glenshaw Glass Co.
v. Commissioner,2 6 the service in Revenue Ruling 84-108237 ruled that
punitive damages recovered in wrongful death actions (which qualify
as personal injury actions under section 104(a)(2)) 2 1 are includ-
able in income because they are not a restoration of capital. A second
basis for the ruling is that punitive damages are not excludable under
section 104(a)(2) because they are not awarded "on account of" per-
sonal injuries. For the reasons discussed in Part II and amplified below,
the return of capital analysis is irrelevant to the determination of
whether a recovery is excludable under section 104(a)(2). The second
basis for the Service's ruling, that punitive damages are awarded to
deter conduct and not "on account of" personal injuries, also warrants
scrutiny.
A. Footnote 8 of Glenshaw Glass
In its 1955 decision holding punitive damages for fraud and an-
titrust violations includable in income, the Supreme Court, in footnote
8 to the opinion, distinguished personal injury recoveries from recov-
eries for injury to property:
The long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury
recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they roughly corre-
spond to a return of capital cannot support exemption of
punitive damages following injury to property . . . . Damages
for personal injury are by definition compensatory only. Pu-
nitive damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a
restoration of capital for taxation purposes. 23 9
Whether personal injury recoveries actually constitute nontaxable re-
covery of capital, and therefore are not "income" in the first instance,
is irrelevant to a determination whether personal injury recoveries are
excludable under section 104(a)(2), which is a specific statutory ex-
ception to the general rule of section 61(a). Moreover, section 104(a)(2)
was not at issue in Glenshaw Glass. The only issue was whether the
236. 348 U.S. 426, 431 n.8, 75 S. Ct. 473, 477 n.8, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925,
75 S. Ct. 657 (1955).
237. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
238. See generally Rev. Rul 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32 (compensatory wrongful death
award excludable); Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 177 (wrongful death proceeds do not
constitute income) (now superseded and obsolete).
239. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 n.8, 75 S. Ct. 473,
477 n.8, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925, 75 S. Ct. 657 (1955).
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punitive portion of antitrust and business fraud damages constituted
"income."
Significantly, the actual (or compensatory) portion of the recovery
in Glenshaw Glass was clearly and concededly includable in income,
which is not the case when a personal injury plaintiff recovers both
compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court observed that
"it would be an anomaly that could not be justified in the absence
of clear congressional intent to say that a recovery for actual damages
is taxable but not the additional amount extracted as punishment for
the same conduct which caused the injury. '240
Glenshaw Glass thus held that punitive damages recovered for
injury to business or property are income, and observed that in order
for exclusion, clear congressional intent to exclude such damages from
income would be required. In the personal injury context, there is a
clear Congressional intent (section 104(a)(2) and its predecessors) to
permit exclusion of "any damages" received "on account of" such
personal injury. The inquiry is not whether damages received by a tort
victim are income; the only question is whether they qualify for the
statutory exclusion.
Secondly, the "long history of departmental rulings ' 241 cited by
the Glenshaw Glass Court as holding personal injury recoveries non-
taxable under the return of capital analysis represent nothing more
than an unnecessary exercise. Regardless of whether such recoveries
have ever been properly characterized as income, the statutory exclusion
of such recoveries from income has existed since 1918. Nonetheless,
as the rulings cited by the Supreme Court illustrate, the applicability
of the statutory exclusion has not always been acknowledged, due in
large part to the notion that personal injury damages are not income. 242
The Glenshaw Glass footnote contains a questionable general state-
ment concerning the nature of personal injury damages: "Damages for
personal injury are by definition compensatory only. ' 243 If this is true,
240. Id. at 431, 75 S. Ct. at 477.
241. Id. at 431 n.8, 75 S. Ct. at 477 n.8.
242. The rulings cited by the Glenshaw Glass Court were: Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B.
71 (1920) (holding damages for alienation of affection not excludable under the pred-
ecessor of section 104(a)(2) because, in the Solicitor's opinion, the exclusion applied
only to damages for physical injuries); Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (effectively
superseding Sol. Mem. 1384 by holding that damages for certain nonphysical personal
injuries do not constitute income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment);
VII-2 C.B. 123 (1928) (damages paid to surviving spouse of person killed during sinking
of steamship Lusitania not income); Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179 (wrongful death
proceeds paid to beneficiaries of New Jersey decedent not income).
243. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431 n.8, 75 S. Ct. at 477 n.8.
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then punitive damages are never excludable under section 104(a)(2)
because, "by definition," they are not damages for personal injury.
Damages for various personal injuries, the Supreme Court's statement
notwithstanding, are not by definition only compensatory. For example,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts includes compensation as only one
of four purposes for which tort actions are maintainable, 244 and states
that the "rules for determining the measure of damages in tort are
based upon the purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable. '245
Moreover, as discussed in Part D, infra, although the Glenshaw Glass
opinion refers only to the punishment/deterrent aspect of punitive
damages, damages labelled as punitive or exemplary are awarded for
other purposes as well.
B. Revenue Ruling 84-108 and its Predecessors
One year after the Glenshaw Glass decision, the Treasury De-
partment promulgated a new regulation under section 61 that incor-
porated the Glenshaw Glass holding and stated that "punitive damages
such as treble damages under the antitrust laws and exemplary damages
for fraud are gross income. ' ' 246 Two years later, the Service issued
Revenue Ruling 58-418,247 which considered the taxability of an amount
received in settlement of a libel suit. The taxpayer had sought both
compensatory and punitive damages for injury to his personal repu-
tation. The Service concluded that the compensatory portion of the
award was excludable from income, but that the portion representing
punitive damages was includable in gross income.
In 1975, however, the Service reconsidered whether punitive dam-
ages received on account of personal injury were includable in gross
income. In Revenue Ruling 75-45,248 the Service addressed the taxability
of a payment made by a corporate employer's insurer following the
death of an employee who was killed while a passenger in the em-
ployer's airplane. Under the terms of the aircraft liability insurance
policy held by the employer, the insurer would pay specified sums to
244. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 901 (1977). The four purposes listed are:
(a) To give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms;
(b) To determine rights;
(c) To punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and
(d) To vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful self-
help.
Id.
245. Id.
246. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (1987).
247. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
248. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
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individuals injured while passengers, or to those individuals' personal
representatives in the case of death. Such payments were conditioned
upon execution (by the injured party or the decedent's personal rep-
resentative) of a complete release of all claims for damages against
the insured. The release executed by the decedent's personal represen-
tative included all claims that could be brought under the state's
wrongful death act, which had been interpreted as providing exclusively
damages that "were punitive in nature. '249 Since 1974, when Massa-
chusetts amended its wrongful death damages statute to provide for
compensatory payments, Alabama is the only state whose wrongful
death damages have been interpreted as punitive in nature. 2 0
The Service concluded that the entire payment was excludable under
section 104(a)(2). First, the Service ruled that the payment constituted
"damages received" within the meaning of section 104(a)(2). 251 The
Service then concluded that the entire payment was excludable from
income under section 104(a)(2) because "under section 104(a)(2) any
damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received on account of
personal injuries or sickness are excludable from gross income. 252
Three years later, however, the General Counsel of the Internal
Revenue Service issued a memorandum253 stating that Revenue Ruling
75-45 was incorrect and should be revoked. The General Counsel opined
that punitive damages received on account of personal injury or sickness
were not excludable from income under section 104(a)(2).
In 1984 the Service issued Revenue Ruling 84-108,24 which officially
revoked Revenue Ruling 75-45. A 1983 General Counsel Memorandum 25'
served as the official basis for this administrative action, although
some impetus was undoubtedly provided by judicial asides in the Tax
Court and Ninth Circuit opinions in Roemer v. Commissioner.2 6 The
Tax Court majority in Roemer noted that the exclusion from income
of punitive damages was based solely on the Commissioner's "admin-
istrative discretion," and that the Commissioner's interpretation of
"any damages" as including punitive damages "arguably comes within
249. Id.
250. Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong Rule: the IRS Demands
a Return on All Punitive Damages, 17 Conn. L. Rev. 39, 44 (1984).
251. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. This conclusion mirrored the Service's earlier
holding in Rev. Rul. 58-578, 1958-2 C.B. 38 that such payments constituted "damages."
Rev. Rul. 75-45 superseded Rev. Rul. 58-578.
252. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
253. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398 (Jan. 31, 1978).
254. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
255. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,390 (Jan. 25, 1983).
256. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra Part II C
[Vol. 48
TAXA TION OF DAMAGES
the language of section 104(c)(4) [Sic] . ' 257 Dissenting Judge Wilbur was
even more direct. He stated:
The law is clear that punitive or exemplary damages must be
included in gross income, and I would so hold. Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). Punitive damages
are certainly not intended to compensate petitioner for a loss
within the meaning of section 104. I realize that respondent
has a revenue ruling that suggests a contrary result. Rev. Rul.
75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. . . . Nevertheless, the facts in Rev. Rul.
75-45, supra, are sufficiently different from those herein to
permit the surprising but general language of the ruling to be
disregarded for now. 258
Perhaps the crowning blow was delivered by the Ninth Circuit, which
reversed the Tax Court's decision and ruled in favor of the taxpayer
on the compensatory damages issue, but characterized the Service's
position regarding punitive damages as liberal. 25 9 Within six months
of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roemer, the Service issued Revenue
Ruling 84-10826o and revoked Revenue Ruling 75-45.
Revenue Ruling 84-108 dealt with two identically situated widows
who received settlement payments from the insurer of their deceased
spouses' employers. Both decedents had died in airplane crashes, and
their employers' insurance policies provided for payment only after
the deceased employee's personal representative executed a release of
the employer from any wrongful death claims. One widow resided in
Virginia, which characterizes wrongful death recoveries as compensa-
tory, and the other widow resided in Alabama, which characterizes
wrongful death recoveries as punitive. The Service ruled that the Vir-
ginia widow's recovery was fully taxable because it constituted a re-
covery of punitive damages, which henceforth would be fully includable
in income.
In holding that punitive damages are not excludable under section
104(a)(2), the Service cited two cases, Glenshaw Glass and Starrels v.
Commissioner.2 6' Glenshaw Glass v. Commissioner was cited for the
propositions that punitive damages recovered in a fraud or antitrust
action constitute income, are not a return of capital, and that they
257. 79 T.C. at 408 (emphasis in original).
258. Id. at 414-15 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
259. "Normally, an amount awarded for punitive damages is includable in gross
income . . . . Nevertheless, the Commissioner liberally interprets § 104(a)(2) to exclude
punitive damages as well as all compensatory damages where there has been a personal
injury." Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983).
260. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
261. 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'g, 35 T.C. 646 (1961).
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are not designed to compensate the plaintiff for any loss, but instead
are "extracted from the wrongdoer as punishment for unlawful con-
duct. ' 262 Starrels was cited for its application of the return of capital
analysis. However, the Service misconstrued the Starrels holding.
In Starrels the taxpayer consented to the portrayal of her family
in a motion picture, in exchange for a payment from the film company.
The taxpayer maintained that the film would constitute an invasion
of privacy, and that the advance payment to her therefore was ex-
cludable under section 104(a)(2). The court in Starrels ruled that the
advance payments were not excludable because the taxpayer had not
suffered a personal injury. Although it would seem that an invasion
of privacy is no more or less a personal injury because it is compensated
for in advance rather than after the fact, numerous cases have held
that advance payments do not qualify for the statutory exclusion.2 6 1
After noting the Glenshaw Glass discussion of punitive damages as
not representing a return of capital, the Starrels court held that section
104(a)(2) "cannot support the exemption of payments made for injuries
which have never occurred because such payments are not compensatory
and hence cannot be considered a restoration of capital. ' 26 4 Interest-
ingly, the Starrels court cited six revenue rulings and two cases (in
addition to the Glenshaw Glass footnote 8 discussion) as authority for
the return of capital analysis. Each of these authorities dealt with
injuries to property; none involved alleged personal injury.
The Service's description of Starrels is misleading and incorrect.
According to the Service, Starrels
held that damages paid for personal injuries are excluded from
gross income under section 104(a)(2) because, in effect they
restore a loss of capital. An award of punitive damages, how-
ever, does not compensate a taxpayer for a loss but adds to
the taxpayer's wealth. Furthermore, punitive damages are
awarded not "on account of personal injury," as required by
section 104(a)(2), but are determined with reference to the
defendant's degree of fault.165
There was no issue concerning punitive damages in Starrels, and its
statements concerning the taxability of punitive damages are therefore
262. 348 U.S. 426, 431, 75 S. Ct. 473, 477, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925, 75 S. Ct.
657 (1955).
263. See, e.g., Roosevelt v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 77, 90 (1964); Miller v. Com-
missioner, 35 T.C. 631, 645 (1961), aff'd, 299 F.2d 706, 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 923, 82 S. Ct. 1564 (1962); Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.
Tenn. 1959).
264. 304 F.2d at 575.
265. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 48
TAXATION OF DAMA GES
nothing more than dicta in which the Starrels court cited dicta from
Glenshaw Glass. Furthermore, the Glenshaw Glass characterization of
personal injury awards as "by definition" compensatory only is ques-
tionable at best. 266 Thus, to remove punitive damages from section
104(a)(2)'s umbrella of "any damages" received "on account of"
personal injury simply cannot be justified on the basis of an erroneous
statement contained in dicta in a footnote in a thirty year old case
that did not involve section 104(a)(2).
C. Burford v. United States
The first and, to date, only consideration of Revenue Ruling 84-
108 occurred, appropriately, in Alabama and in the context of a
wrongful death recovery. Revenue Ruling 84-108 had specifically found
that because Alabama law characterizes wrongful death recoveries as
punitive in nature, such awards were not excludable from income under
section 104(a)(2). In Burford v. United States,267 Judge Lynne, in a
memorandum opinion granting Burford's motion for summary judg-
ment, held that "Revenue Ruling 84-108 constitutes an unwarranted
administrative amendment of the clear language of the Internal Revenue
Code and cannot stand. ' 268
Judge Lynne noted that the proper starting place for construction
of section 104(a)(2) is the statute itself, and found "the clear import"
of section 104(a)(2)'s exclusion of "any damages" to include a "Con-
gressional intent to exclude wrongful death proceeds-regardless of
whether those proceeds are classified as compensatory or punitive-
from gross income. '269 Addressing Revenue Ruling 84-108, he found
its reliance on Glenshaw Glass "misplaced," principally because the
compensatory damages involved in that case were unquestionably tax-
able. In a footnote, Judge Lynne disagreed with
the Service's contention that footnote eight of the Glenshaw
Glass opinion serves as authority for Rev. Rul. 84-108. The
footnote is nothing more than dicta concerning punitive dam-
ages in a business context and offers no precedential or per-
suasive support for defendant's position. 270
The factual context of Burford may limit its applicability to other
recipients of punitive damages. At issue in Burford was whether Al-
abama's wrongful death statute, which has been interpreted as providing
266. See infra Part D.
267. 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
268. Id. at 636.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 637.
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only punitive damages, is properly construed as providing damages
"on account of" personal injuries. The court found that a construction
of the statute that it did, in fact, provide such damages, was proper.
Only a contorted reading of [section 104(a)(2)] can lead to the
interpretation that wrongful death actions [sic] are not received
on account of personal injury. To contend that such proceeds
are received only because of the tortfeasor's wrongful conduct
and not because of a personal injury is neither logical nor
realistic. 271
Because the entire recovery under the Alabama wrongful death statute
is punitive in nature, Burford is arguably distinguishable from a sit-
uation in which a plaintiff's recovery includes both punitive and com-
pensatory elements. Nonetheless, Burford certainly provides direct
support for the contention that any punitive damages awarded in a
personal injury action are excludable. As Judge Lynne observed:
The Service is correct in its statement that Alabama wrongful
death proceeds are intended to punish and deter wrongdoers.
This characterization does not alter the inescapable fact that
a wrongful death action arises only upon a person's death. 272
Similarly, punitive damages in any personal injury action are awarded
''on account of" the underlying injury, in the sense that they would
not have been awarded but for the occurrence of the injury. The
statutory language does not limit excludability to compensatory dam-
ages; it broadly excludes "any damages" received "on account of"
personal injury. Congress could have limited the exclusion to com-
pensatory damages but it did not. Nonetheless, the Service now reads
"on account of" as meaning "to compensate for" and presumes that
damages labeled as "exemplary" or "punitive" are never compensatory
in nature.
D. Extrapolating from a Unique Statute
Both Revenue Ruling 75-45 and 84-108 dealt with proceeds received
under Alabama's wrongful death statute, which is the only wrongful
death statute that has been interpreted as providing only damages that
are punitive in nature. 73 Both rulings correctly concluded that the
payments under the insurance policies, which were conditioned on the
decedent's personal representative releasing the insured from any claim
for damages, were damages received within the meaning of section
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 248-59.
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1.104-1(c) of the regulations. Therefore, the Service does take the
position that punitive damages are "any damages received." Instead,
it concludes that punitive damages (the only type of damages available
under the Alabama wrongful death statute) are not excludable for two
reasons: first, because they do not represent a restoration of capital;
second, because they are not awarded "on account of" personal injuries
but instead are designed solely to punish the tortfeasor. The first reason
is incorrect because it simply ignores the existence of section 104(a)(2),
which permits exclusion of items that would otherwise be includable
as gross income under section 61. The second reason is simply an
erroneous generalization that is incorrect even as applied to the facts
of the ruling.
That the Service intends the rule of includability of punitive damages
to apply in all cases cannot be gainsaid. Revenue Ruling 84-108 itself
does not explicitly so state, but other evidence of the Service's intent
abounds. First, Revenue Ruling 75-45, although issued in the factual
context of the Alabama wrongful death statute, explicitly extended its
holding to all punitive damages in personal injury actions. The Service
concluded in that ruling as follows: "Therefore, under section 104(a)(2)
any damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received on account
of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from gross income''274
Revenue Ruling 84-108 revoked Revenue Ruling 75-45, thus rendering
the latter's statement of general applicability void. 275 Furthermore, in
subsequent rulings, the Service has characterized Revenue Ruling 84-
108 as holding that "[plunitive damages . . . are not excludable from
income." 276
In Revenue Ruling 84-108, the Service interpreted the words "on
account of" personal injury to mean "to compensate for" personal
injury. It then ignored existing case law in which Alabama courts
construed the wrongful death statute as providing damages on account
of personal injury. Because the Service was considering a unique statute,
it need not have pronounced a rule of general applicability based on
that statute. Indeed, as Burford correctly notes, Alabama courts have
rejected the very premise of Revenue Ruling 84-108 by holding that
recoveries under the wrongful death statute are not designed solely to
punish the wrongdoer. 277 In a 1935 case, the Alabama Supreme Court
274. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
275. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
276. Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51; see also Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55
("This revenue ruling deals only with the compensatory damages. With respect to the
taxability of the punitive damages, see Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.") (libel suit
involving compensatory and punitive damages).
277. Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635, 637 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
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rejected the defendant's contention that wrongful death damages were
awarded solely for willful or wanton conduct and not on account of
bodily injury or death. 279 The court held that wrongful death damages
under the Alabama statute, although labeled as "punitive," are awarded
"on account of' personal injury or death. 279
Although Alabama's wrongful death statute is unique in that it
labels all damages recoverable thereunder as punitive, Alabama is not
alone in awarding "punitive damages" that are designed, at least in
part, to compensate the recipient. Courts and commentators have long
recognized that, although punitive damages are usually awarded to
punish the tortfeasor and deter future tortious conduct, they serve the
additional functions of compensating the victim for wounded feelings
and providing incentive for injured parties to sue by creating a fund
for payment of attorneys' fees. 210 Indeed, some jurisdictions provide
for damages that may be awarded either to punish the tortfeasor or
to compensate the victim. 21' When a plaintiff recovers an award under
such a statute, only the jury will know whether the amount was intended
solely to punish the wrongdoer, or solely to compensate the plaintiff,
or some combination of the two. Recipients of such awards could cite
Niles v. United States2s2 as authority for excluding the entire amount
awarded under such a statute, since it is impossible to establish the
jury's intent. On the other hand, the Service would undoubtedly take
the position that the entire amount is includable in income under
Revenue Ruling 84-108, because it bears the label "punitive" or "ex-
emplary" damages.
In summary, the Service's interpretation of "on account of" per-
sonal injury as meaning "to compensate for" personal injury does
not exclude all punitive damages from qualification under section
104(a)(2). Some jurisdictions permit the awarding of damages labeled
as "punitive" or "exemplary" for compensatory purposes. Thus, Rev-
enue Ruling 84-108, as applied to the facts of the Revenue Ruling
itself, is incorrect even if section 104(a)(2) applies only to compensatory
awards. Furthermore, there is no reason to read section 104(a)(2) as
applying only to compensatory awards. If Congress intended to permit
the exclusion of compensatory awards only, it could have so provided,
just as it did so provide in section 104(a)(1), which provides that
278. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935).
279. Id. at 106.
280. See generally D. Dobbs, Remedies 205 (1976); W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton
On the Law of Torts 9, (5th ed. 1984); Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine,
25 Drake L. Rev. 870, 875-76 (1976); Morrison, supra note 250, at 68-80.
281. See Morrison, supra note 250, at 69-73 (discussing Georgia law).
282. 710 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
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worker's compensation awards are excludable if received "as compen-
sation for personal injuries or sickness." '283 The Service lacks the au-
thority to amend section 104(a)(2) so as to exclude any category of
damages, including punitive damages, that are awarded "on account
of" personal injury. In the absence of any Congressional indication
that it meant "on account of" to mean "to compensate for," such
a restrictive interpretation is unwarranted and unenforceable.
E. Hitting a Moving Target
The laws governing punitive damages are not only diverse, but are
increasingly the subject of proposed and actual revisions. In 1986, the
legislatures of forty-one states enacted new legislation governing dam-
ages and restitution. 2 4 In February 1987 the American Bar Association's
House of Delegates approved recommendations of the A.B.A. Action
Commission to improve the Tort Liability System that included the
following:
Recommendation No.5
The scope of punitive damages in cases involving damage to
person or property should be narrowed through the following
measures:
e. To whom award should be paid. After deducting costs
and expenses, the court should determine what is a reasonable
portion of the punitive damages award to compensate the plain-
tiff and counsel for bringing the action and prosecuting the
punitive damages claim, with the balance of that award allo-
cated to public purposes. 285
Presumably, if every jurisdiction were to adopt the above recommen-
dation, the Service would agree that the portion of the "punitive
damages" that is allocated to the plaintiff is compensatory and there-
fore excludable. (The portion set aside for "public purposes" would,
of course, present no problem because the plaintiff would have no
right to receive it.) Yet, even this may not be a safe assumption in
light of the Service's disregard of controlling precedent in Alabama
concerning the nature of its wrongful death punitive damages.
Of course, it is unrealistic to expect uniformity in the fifty states
(and the numerous federal damages provisions) concerning the stan-
283. I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) (1986).
284. See, e.g., Thomas, Rights, Remedies, Restitution and "Reform"-the 1987
Torts Dialogue, 47 A.B.A. J. 8 (July 1, 1987).
285. Report to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association Action
Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System, 18-19 (February 1987); see Thomas,
supra note 284.
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dards governing punitive damages. Nonetheless, recipients of punitive
damages-under the whole spectrum of existing statutes-must currently
decide whether to follow the Service's reasoning (which would appar-
ently permit exclusion of punitive awards that bear a compensatory
element) or its holding (that punitive damages are not excludable) or,
alternatively, whether to reject Revenue Ruling 84-108, as has the only
court that has considered it. Because of the proliferation of new and
stiffened penalty provisions in recent years,28 6 the stakes are too high
to justify or permit the current confusion to persist.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come for Congress to make its intentions known and
for the Service to abandon its inconsistent positions concerning the
effects of state law on the taxability of personal injury damages.
Although it may be fisc-protective to maintain that state law labeling
of damages as punitive or compensatory is dispositive, but that state
law characterization of the nature of the claim is irrelevant, such
fundamentally inconsistent positions must eventually be reconciled or
one of them abandoned. Unless and until Congress amends section
104(a)(2) to provide for exclusion of compensatory awards only, all
punitive damages received on account of an invasion of a tort or tort-
type right should be excludable. Because the statutory language broadly
applies to "any damages" received "on account of" a personal injury,
the exclusion now encompasses types of awards that were nonexistent
(or at most rare) when the statutory exclusion was first enacted. Pu-
nitive damages recovered in a breach of contract action for "bad
faith" are excludable under the statue because they represent "any
damages" that were recovered "on account of" what is now classified
as a tort.
Amending section 104(a)(2) to provide an exclusion only for com-
pensatory damages would not solve all the problems posed by the
Service's current approach to the exclusion. Indeed, the most perplexing
issue currently is whether damages compensating for lost earnings
should be taxed. Although such awards have been excludable histor-
ically if recovered in connection with a physical injury, they are almost
always held taxable when recovered for dignitary invasions, such as
defamation or prohibited discrimination. In light of the plethora of
cases currently being litigated on this issue, congressional action to
clarify its position is long overdue.
286. See generally, Greisman, Many Penalties Substantially Increased as a Result of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 37 Tax, for Accountants 378 (1986); Silets, TEFRA
Penalties in Action, 43d N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax ch. 9 (1985).
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